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1. SUMMARY: ISSUES: {1) Does a state program of 
secular, supplementary instruction, conducted in classrooms of 
'-- nonpublic schools leased and controlled by the public schools, 
~IN ~. violate the Establishment Clause? {2) Is there general 
/( ~-~.J is 3'"''de~( rt sl-..vil k.')( l,c (,Ju L'-1. I/ 10 J. I w;~h No~. <gJ -~IJ 2 ~- "! '}...~ t_!,lo," r .. "\.1 s.·~'>·Jv.f Co-x'Hotv_ /, 
J,Jf., ( t 11/fb.?<•, •·CJY11'•rt v/n/..2.4-vu '-a.•f .2 r?-/:r lf :t?'1r~n.,:'"t) A.s ~ Vl'td~Y&/ ,.,fviHifrl, 
.;r.. H....,/... n a.1..-~ r/,g,f 1t,e rewlt be/,;.-y ,·s tJPe.If-;r;ry,a.U· But ,f r.s ve.v7 t.c.,£ 1b J..,Jn·"!v'JL ~ 
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"taxpayer standing" to bring a suit challenging such a 
program? 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: The Grand Rapids School 
District (GRSD) has for 6 years offered "shared time" and 
"community education" classes on the premises of nonpublic 
(including parochial) schools. This program is authorized, 
though not mandated, by Michigan law. GRSD provides the 
instructors for the classes, and leases classroom space from 
the nonpublic schools. No religious symbols or artifacts may 
be displayed in the classrooms, and instructors are required 
to post a sign within the class area designating it as a 
public school classroom. 
All the instruction is ~ecular ) The "shared time" 
classes (remedial and enrichment math and reading, art, music, 
and phys ed) take place during regular school hours. They are --------offered at both elementary and secondary levels. None of 
these classes replace or supplant classes otherwise offered by 
the nonpublic schools. They are designed merely as a 
supplement to the normal education, a blend of remedial, 
advanced and enrichment courses. The DC found that about 10% 
of a nonpublic school student's time was taken up with such 
courses. The classes were open to all students eligible to 
attend a public school. As a practical matter, however, since 
such courses were already available in the public schools, 
those attending the courses at a given nonpublic school were 
those enrolled in that school. 
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The "community education" classes (model building, arts 
~--
and crafts, typing, etc.) are scheduled outside regular school 
hours. The teachers of these classes are employed part-time 
by GRSD, and the majority of them are employed full-time by 
the situs school, whether public or private. 
Six state taxpayer pls and one institutional pl 
(Americans United for Separation of Church and State) brought 
suit in DC, challenging the constitutionality of providing 
these courses on premises leased from and otherwise occupied 
by religious schools. The institutional pl was dismissed by 
the DC for lack of standing. But the individual pls 
prevailed, and the DC permanently enjoined GRSD from 
continuing to operate and conduct these programs on the 
premises of nonpublic schools. 
u.s. 
Applying the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
602 (1971), the DC found, first, that t~urpose of the 
< 
program was "manifestly secular" and that there was "no basis 
to form a conclusion that there was any purpose or intent to 
advance reli* unconstitutionally." Second, however, the DC 
found that ~rimary effect" of the program was to advance 
religion. Parochial school children compose over 80% of the 
benefitted class (i.e., the class of all those nonpublic -school children participating). There is also a "potential" 
for advancing religious doctrines in the program, since ~ 
of the teachers in the shared-time program and many in the 
community-education program were formerly or are still 
employed by the nonpublic schools to which they were assigned 
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by GRSD. More fundamentally, the challenged courses are 
conducted in the "sectarian atmosphere" of the religious 
schools. Finally, the program confers substantial financial 
benefits on the parochial schools by employing and paying from 
tax funds the numerous instructors who teach subjects in the 
leased classrooms. 
entanglement of government with religion. There is a 
potential for political divisiveness--some will want to spend 
the money to help the church schools and others won't. Also, 
in order to ensure that no religious doctrine creeps into the 
instruction, GRSD must monitor the goings-on at the religious 
schools leading to excessive administrative entanglement. In 
sum, the workings of the program require too much 
intermingling of public and nonpublic personnel, courses and 
other materials. 
A divided CA6 affirmed. The CA acknowledged that there 
was no proof that any teacher in the program sought in the 
classes to indoctrinate any student in accordance with the 
school's religious persuasion. But the CA found that four 
signficant features of the program rendered it 
----------------------------------------unc~ (1) it is primarily a program of assistance \~ 
to elementary schools; (2) it gives substantial financial aid 
to education in parochial school buildings; (3) the parochial 
schools concerned have religious indoctrination as a primary 
school purpose; and (4) the impact upon the taxpayers and the 
parochial schools is direct. The majority also expressed a 
. I 
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curious concern that this same sort of program, if 
legitimized, might spread nationwide and be applied to "less 
orthodox religious sects" who would act with more religious 
zeal and less social responsibility than the church schools at 
iss~ere. 
Judge Krupansky dissented, claiming that the majority 
ignored the actual operational history of the program. 
Absolutely no evidence of indoctrination or attempted 
indoctrination exists during the six years of the program's 
operation. The majority merely adopts a per se rule that 
conducting courses on premises owned by nonpublic schools 
violates the Establishment Clause. 
More specifically, the dissent challenged the primary 
purpose conclusion of the majority. The class of 
beneficiaries is all students, not just the nonpublic 
~ -
students, since the shared time and community education 
courses are available at public schools as well (as part of 
the extensive regular curriculum) and not just at the 
challenged nonpublic schools. Moreover, there is no direct 
financial benefit to the parochial schools since the courses --------------
are all supplemental and not part of the core curriculum which 
must be offered as a condition of state accreditation. Nor 
was there any evidence that this expanded supplemental 
curriculum has resulted in an increase in enrollments at the 
participating schools. Finally, the majority's reliance on 
hypothetical speculation as to the potential for religious 
-' 
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indoctrination is inappropriate, especially in view of a 
record which shows the contrary. 
As for excessive entanglement, the dissent saw very 
little of it in this case. The mere unrealized possibility 
that an instructor might try to use the program for religious 
means does not require incessant monitoring. 
enough to deal with that problem if it arises. 
There is time 
5~ 
Finally, the dissent argues that the pls lacked standing. 
In Valley Forge Christian College, 102 S.Ct. 752 (1982), the 
Court held that a federal taxpayer will possess standing as a 
taxpayer only where the challenged spending or fiscal 
appropriations derive from a legislative enactment promulgated 
in accordiance with the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, 
§8. By analogy, a state taxpayer must challenge 
appropriations derived from the state's constitutional 
equivalent to Art. I, §8. The pls here have not challenged 
any statutory provision. They brought suit directly against 
GRSD and sought only a declaration that the leasing and shared 
time arrangments violated the Establishment Clause. That is, 
they simply challenged executive decisions, not exercises of 
legislative power. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs argue that the CA6's per se, 
geographic ruling flies in the face of this Court's constant 
admonition to consider the facts of each case in deciding 
Establishment Clause issues. See, e.g., Comm. for Public 
Educ. and Religious Liberty, 444 u.s. 646, 662 (1980). More 
specifically, petrs repeat the arguments of Judge Krupansky on 
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the issues of "primary purpose" and "excessive entanglement." 
They further observe that there has been, in fact, little or 
no public controversy over the program, which is paid for out 
of general GRSD funds, rather than requiring specific 
appropriations. 
Petrs further argue that the CA6's decision unduly limits 
the flexibility of States in meeting the educational needs of 
all school-age children. Past opinions of this Court have 
allowed States to provide many forms of assistance to 
nonpublic schools, including transportation, textbooks, and 
diagnostic, therapeutic and remedial services. See, e.g., 
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 u.s. 1 (1947); Bd. of Educ. v. 
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). Shared time and community 
education programming, both effective means of improving 
overall education, should not be relegated to the scrapheap--
at least, not without review of this Court. In Wheeler v. 
Barrer, 417 u.s. 402 (1974), the Court left open a similar 
question (in the context of remedial services provided under 
Title I) as to whether educational services may be provided to 
nonpublic school students at religiously-oriented nonpublic 
schools. 
Petrs also point out that the CA6's decision is in direct 
conflict with decisions of the Michigan appellate courts 
approving the program. See Traverse City School District v. 
Attorney General, 185 N.W.2d 9 (Mich. 1971); Citizens to 
Advance Public Educ. v. State Superintendent of Public 




Finally, petrs argue that the pls had no standing under 
Valley Forge. 
Resps argue that there is little or no difference between 
the GRSD program and the "purchase of secular services" 
invalidated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602 {1971), or the 
supplemental salary program invalidated in Earley v. DiCenso, 
403 u.s. 602 {1971). The end result is to supplement with tax 
dollars the teaching of important parts of the curriculum of 
sectarian schools. The "leases" are merely a fiction to 
facilitate this scheme. The decision below is also compatible 
with the great weight of lower court decisions on "lease" 
programs. See 485 F.Supp. 432 {WD Mich 1980); 337 F.Supp. 545 
{D Vt 1972); 359 F.Supp. 505 {D NH 1973); 507 P2d 839 {Or App 
1973); 369 F.Supp. 1059 {ED Ky 1974). Two apparently contrary 
decisions are distinguishable on their facts because in one, 
195 NW2d 161 {Neb.), cert denied, 409 u.s. 921 {1972), 
students from both public and private schools attended the 
classes, and in the other, 489 F.Supp. 1248 {SD NY 1980), 
appeal dismissed, 449 u.s. 808, the DC found that the schools 
were not "pervasively sectarian," that there were only minor 
administrative contacts, and that the program had not 
generated any political divisiveness. 
Resps further argue that petrs mischaracterize the CA6's 
decision, which does not involve a per se geographic ruling 
that the program is unconstitutional merely because conducted 
in religious schools. Rather, the CA6 found considerable 
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entanglement, which threatened to bring about a virtual merger 
of the public and nonpublic school systems. 
Finally, resps argue that any standing problem is merely 
a matter of a technical deficiency in the pleadings, which can 
be corrected at any time by an amendment under FRCP 15(b). 
The statutory authority for the challenged program is clear, 
and was cited and discussed by the DC. Thus, petrs had 
taxpayer standing based on the record evidence at trial. 
4. DISCUSSION: I don't think petrs' (or the dissent's) 
characterization of the CA6's decision, as a per se geographic 
prohibition, is unfair. No specific findings as to instances 
of (as opposed to general assumptions of the potential for) 
indoctrination, political divisiveness, and administrative 
entanglement were made. The reasoning of the CA6 would 
invalidate any such program, regardless of the particular 
circumstances. 
The question raised here has never been directly resolved 
---~ 
by this Court, although Meek v. Pittenger, 421 u.s. 349 
(1975), is pretty close. Also, the question is undoubtedly 
~ 
important. A widespread and apparently effective supplemental 
education program, approved by the state legislature and 
courts, carried on for 6 years and affecting thousands of 
students, has been invalidated by a federal court in sweeping 
terms. The case is, in a sense, factbound; but so are all 
Establishment Clause questions. The only thing settled about 
the law in this area is the [~~rm of wor~~nvoked: "secular 
purpose," "primary eff~ct," and "excessive entanglement." No 
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one really seems to have a very clear idea what these phrases 
mean or where exactly the line is to be drawn. This case 
could provide the Court with an opportunity to chart another 
portion of the boundary. 
Furthermore, I think the CA6 was probably wrong, despite . 
Meek. The obvious purpose and primary effect of this program ( 7/Z-
)~ 
is secular: to raise the level of education in the populace at ~~ 
large. Surely the State has not only a compelling interest, 
but also a fundamental obligation, to advance that purpose. 
Moreover, the program is administered in a neutral manner. 
All nonpublic schools may participate, whether religious or 
not, and the courses offered are identical to those 
supplemental courses offered in public schools. Given the 
formalized procedures for leasing classrooms and ensuring that 
they are free of all religious symbols and artifacts, there 
seems to be little danger of excessive entanglement. The 
State exercises control over all the teachers, just as it does 
in its own classrooms on the premises of public schools. 
In Meek, however, the Court declared unconstitutional a 
program providing "auxiliary services" (such as counseling, 
speech and hearing therapy, teaching for exceptional and 
remedial students, etc.) in nonpublic schools. The teachers 
in that program were hired by the State and were not under the 
control of the parochial schools. The court specifically 
declined to decide "whether substantial state expenditures to 
enrich the curricula of church-related elementary and 
secondary schools, like the expenditure of state funds to 
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support the basic educational program of those schools, 
necessarily result in the direct and substantial advancement 
of religious activity." 349 U.S., at 369. But the Court did 
find an excessive entanglement based on the need constantly to 
monitor the activities of the teachers to be sure that they 
don't advance the religious mission of the schools while on 
the public payroll. "The fact that the teachers and 
counselors providing auxiliary services are employees of the 
public intermediate unit, rather than of the church-related 
schools in which they work, does not substantially eliminate 
the need for continuing surveillance." Id., at 371. The 
Court also found a serious potential for political 
divisiveness over the issue of aid to religion. 
The instant case is distinguishable on the grounds 
special care has been taken to ensure a "public school" 
enclave in the midst of the private schools. Surely, GRSD 
could constitutionally make all these courses available to 
private school students away from the nonpublic schools. It 
seems silly to hold that GRSD can do exactly the same thing it 
is doing now, but that it must do so at other locations, at 
greater expense to itself and greater inconvenience to the 
students. Furthermore, with all respect, the reasoning in 
-------------.. 
Meek makes little sense. There is no more need to monitor a 
~
public school teacher temporarily on a parochial campus than 
there is to monitor one teaching at a public school. 
Indoctrination could be attempted in either event. Unless one 
feels that religion is as contagious as swine flu, there is no 
< ; 
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reason to fear that the mere act of walking onto a parochial 
school campus and proceeding to the religiously antiseptic 
classroom will cause the teacher of a secular subject to begin 
spouting sectarian cant instead of remedial math. At any 
rate, the 6-year track record of this particular program, with 
no recorded instances of abuse and substantial benefits for 
all, should not be simply disregarded. 
On the standing question, resps are probably correct that 
more artful pleading could have gotten them around the Valley 
Forge problem. At any rate, the issue does not seem to merit 
independent review. 
Given the apparently widespread use of these lease-time 
programs, the important state interest in raising the 
'------------
educational standards of all citizens, the conflicting 
decisions among the lower courts, and the arguably erroneous 
result below, I recommend that the petition be GRANTED. 
There is a response. 
January 27, 1984 Kellogg Opn in Petn 
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Joe 
Re: No. 83-990 School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball 
This case was relisted for you. Before Conference, I r ecom-
mended that if this case were granted, it should be set for argu-
ment with Nos. 83-812 & 83-929 Mobile County School Commrs. v. 
Jaffree (moment-of-silence cases) , which was scheduled for the 
February 17, 1984 Conference and which I expected would be grant-
ed. You asked me to ascertain the status of the Mobile cases. -- ---4 As it turns out, they were stricken from the February 17 list 
because Justice Stevens called for a response. (Unfortunately, 
the call was not limited to a particular uestion. Thus, the 
response probably will address at length the question of whether 
this Court's school prayer cases should be overruled.) I do not 
think the fact that Mobile will not be considered for several 
more weeks affects whether the present case should be granted; 
the cases are related only in that they both deal with religion 
in the schools, but oth~rwise the issues are fairly distinct. So 
I think the only reason to take this case is if you are inclined 
to reconsider your vote in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 u.s. 349 
(1975), which is not significantly distinguishable from this 
case. Meek was 6-3 when Justice Stewart was on the Court. On 
Al·d.ou3 ~ fl.t. ~verti(lh ,:r -r,-oiJ /,/u,n • ..,,.J 
reconsideration, my recommendation tentatively is DENY. ~inality 
~ /1 
concerns suggest that the issue should be allowed to lie where 
Meek left it. 
-
jen 02/21/84 ~~ 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Joe 
Re: No. 83-990 School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball 
This case was relisted for you. Before Conference, I recom-
mended that if this case were granted, it should be set for argu-
ment with Nos. 83-812 & 83-929 Mobile County School Commrs. v. 
Jaffree (moment-of-silence cases), which was scheduled for the 
February 17, 1984 Conference and which I expected would be grant-
ed. You asked me to ascertain the status of the Mobile cases. -4 As it turns out, they were stricken from the February 17 list 
because Justice Stevens called for a response. (Unfortunately, 
the call was not limited to a particular uestion. Thus, the 
response probably will address at length the question of whether 
this Court's school prayer cases should be overruled.) I do not 
think the fact that Mobile will not be considered for several 
more weeks affects whether the present case should be granted; 
the cases are related only in that they both deal with religion 
in the schools, but oth~rwise the issues are fairly distinct. So 
I think the only reason to take this case is if you are inclined 
to reconsider your vote in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 u.s. 349 
(1975), which is not significantly distinguishable from this 
case. Meek was 6-3 when Justice Stewart was on the Court. On 
A/t Lo•a L H.. !. 1JVUtitrn ,:,. rvovblt.s-rn.,..,J 
reconsideration, my recommendation tentatively is DENY. ~inality 
~ II 
concerns suggest that the issue should be allowed to lie where 
Meek left it. 
--
February 24, 1984 
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda 
Re: Aguilar v. Felton and School District of Grand Rapids v. 
Ball: Distinctions between the Grand Rapids programs and New 
York's Title I program 
Following are the major attributes of the programs at 
issue in these cases: 
leases the classroom space used for the 
program from the religious school. 
(2) No religious artifacts may be displayed in the leased 
space, but they do exist in surrounding areas. 
(3) The class area must be posted as a public school 
classroom, although there are no such signs posted outside the 
nonpublic school. 
(4) The students attending the Shared Time classes are the ~ ~ 
/U~ 
same ones who attend the nonpublic school regularly. 
(5) Teachers are employed according to ordinary hiring 




portion taught previously in the nonpublic schools, and many were 
assigned to the same such school in which they previously taught. 
(6) Typical course offerings are math, reading, physical 
education, art, and music, although others have been offered. 
The courses are in all instances supplemental and not required 
for graduation, and are offered during the school day. 
- - -
leases the classroom space from the 
religious school, and the same restrictions on posting the 
~ 
space  
and removing religious artifacts apply. ~ 
(2) The courses are offered after regular school hours, are 
~luntary, and include leisure-type courses, as well as --
substantive vocational courses such as typing, computer 
programming, bookkeeping, etc. 
--. 'L ' h h '' . h h 1 h h t1me pr1vate sc ool teac ers 1n t e same sc oo w ere t e 
(3) Most of the Community Education teachers are also full-_ .. 
-Cbmmunity Education courses are offered. 
(4) The courses offered are not available as part of the 
regular curricula at the private schools, but are supplementary 
and not required for graduation. 
(5) The students attending the courses are the same as those $ ~ ~ 
who regularly attend the school where the courses are offered. ~~ 
Title I 
(1) Title I funds are available only to educationally deprived 
children residing in low-income areas. The funds are to be made 
available to such children in private schools on a basis 
"comparable" to that available to public school children. 
(2) Instruction may be provided on the premises of the private 
school only to the extent necessary to make the services 
available, and services may be provided only if not provided by 
the private school itself. 
(3) Title I funds may not be used to pay private school 
teachers or employees except for services performed outside their 
regular hours of duty, under public supervision and control. 
(4) The Local Educational Agency ("LEA"), which directs the 
~e of the local Title I funds, must maintain exclusive direction 
and control over all Title I funds and services; no public funds 
may be disbursed to the private schools. 
(5) The LEA must maintain title to and physical control over 
any instructional materials used, and must remove it from the 
private school's premises, if necessary to prevent its being used 
for other than Title I purposes. 
(6) If the state or LEA fails to comply with these 
requirements, the funds will be terminated, and misspent funds 
will be recouped. 
(7) Five types of remedial instruction_ are provided: in 
reading, reading skills, math, English as a second language, and 
clinical and guidance services. 
(8) Instructors and support staff are all employed by the - --
local school board and are subject solely to its supervision and -- -------~---------control. Assignment of a public school teacher to a Title I 
program is voluntary on the teacher's part, and private school 
officials have no voice in the initial assignment. No inquiry is 
made as to religious affiliation, and they do not play a role in 
assignment. Most of the teachers are itinerant, spending less 
than five days a week at the same school. 
(9) Teachers are given detailed written and oral instructions 
delineating their responsibilities and the restrictions on their 
activities. They have ultimate control over the selection of 
students who participate: they are not to engage in team 
teaching, though they may discuss progress and needs with the 
student's regular teacher: and they are directed not to introduce 
religious topics into their teaching. Teachers are subject to 
periodic evaluations and direct supervision by the local school 
board. 
(10) The classrooms used are denuded of religious symbols, and 
none of the Title I materials have religious content. A 
comprehensive recordkeeping and inventory system is in force to 
prevent misuse of the instructional materials. 
lgs December 6, 1984 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda 
Re: Aguilar v. Felton and School District of Grand Rapids v. 
Ball: Distinctions Between the Programs Involved 
As you will see from the attached list of attributes 
possessed by each program, the major difference between the Title 
I program and the Grand Rapids programs is that Title I has a 
complex and fe~led set?! : eg Qla t ~ onE\ governing the program and 
the teachers involved. Care has been taken in the Title I 
program to neutralize, to the fullest extent possible, every 
aspect of contact between the private school and the Title I 
teachers going in to teach. If there is any program that may be ~ 
upheld, it is Title I. 
The Grand Rapids programs are less formally sanitized~ 
The
1
Shared Time progra~ , which of the two Michigan programs most 
ctosely parallels New York's Title I program, involves similar 
courses, and teachers are apparently told to refrain from 
religious instruction and to keep the instructional materials 
separate. There is apparently no overriding regulatory 
structure, however, and some teachers have affiliations with the 




The Community Education program s Eands by itself in 
u 
that there is vJ irtual identity not only between the religious 
__. ~- ---- ~
~hool student body and students taking the courses, but between 
------------------~--~------~~----~~----~--
religious school teachers and teachers providing the Community 
~ucation instruction. I do not find persuasive petr's argument 
that the program is valid notwithstanding this identity because 
fue courses are mainly leisure-type, voluntary offerings. I do 
not see how the content of the course relates at all to the 
possibility of entanglement. 




MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda 
Re: Establishment Clause cases and the effect of advancing 
religion prong of the Lemon test 
In addition to the part of Meek invalidating the 
~structional materials, your opinion in Committee for Public 
Education v. Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756 (1973), was decided on the 
advancing religion prong of the Lemon three-part test. In that 
case, the Court invalidated grants to religious schools for 
repair and maintenance to ensure student safety)and tuition 
reimbursements and tax deductions to parents of children enrolled 
in religious schools because they had the primary effect of 
advancing religion. You noted that although some forms of aid 
may be channeled to the secular function of religious schools, 
11the channel is a narrow one. 11 !d., at 775. As to the tuition 
reimbursements and tax deductions, you considered that the fact 
~at the aid went to the parents instead of directly to the 
religious schools was only one factor to be considered; the 
effect of the aid was to provide financial support for religious 
----- "" ~~----------------------------~ institutions, and there was no effort to distinguish between 
- ------
secular and religious functions to support only the former. !d., 
at 783. The programs were thus invalid under the Establishment 
• r 
Clause. You noted that the tuition reimbursement program could 
not pass muster under the argument that since the maximum 
reimbursement is only 15% of the educational costs in the private 
schools, and more than 15% of the schools' time is devoted to 
~cular functions, the reimbursements were valid. "A statistical 
~arantee" of neutrality is not enough. Id., at 787. Nor were 
the programs saved by the argument that they were designed to 
promote the free exercise of religion. The State was required to 
be neutral as to religion, and these programs, in advancing 
religion, were not neutral. 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. 1355 
(1984), expressed the view that the "effect of advancing 
religion" prong of Lemon is "properly interpreted not to require 
invalidation of a government practice merely because it in fact 
causes, even as a primary effect, advancement or inhibition of 
religion," but because it has the "effect of communicating a 
message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion." 
Id., at 1368. Under this view, the programs at issue here might 
well be valid--especially the Title I program--because of the 
painstaking procedures to ensure that the teachers remain free of 
religious involvement. On the other hand, the programs at issue 
here might communicate a governmental endorsement of religion by 
providing the support and aid that they do. In short, I believe 
that either way you look at the "effect prong" of the test, an 
advancement of religion must be found. 
lgs December 6, 1984 
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda 
Re: Vote Breakdown on Meek v. Pittenger 
1 Justice Stewart announced the judgment of the Court and 
w~ 
delivered the opinion of the Court (Parts I, II, IV, and V) in 
~ ~you, JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLACKMON, 
Ustice Douglas joined. JUSTICE BRENNAN, in an opinion 
~ joined by JUSTICE MARSHALL and Justice Douglas, dissented from 
~art III of Justice Stewart's opinion, which upheld the textbook 
~~~loan program of the Pennsylvania act. You and JUSTICE BLACKMON 
joined Part III of the opinion, and THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE 
REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE WHITE joinep the portion of the judgment 
upholding the textbook loan program. 
Part I of the opinion stated the factual background of 
the case. Part II summarized the relevant Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, including the three-part test developed by Lemon 
and applied by its progeny. Part III of the opinion discussed 
the Pennsylvania textbook loan program, and upheld it as 
indistinguishable from the New York program upheld in Board of 
Education v. Allen, 392 u.s. 236 (1968). Part IV invalidated the 
lo~~~s as f9nstituting dir~ct aidl ~o the 
religious schools, which had the effect of advancing religious 
activity. Part V invalidated the provision of auxiliary 
~
services, including teachers and counselors to provide remedial 
~ '-------·------------ --~ .. -
instruction and counseling, because there was a potential for the 
impermissible fostering of religion, the prevention of which 
would require surveillance and excessive entanglement. 
~= Mr. Justice Powell December 6, 1984 
From: Lynda 
Nos. 84-237, -238, -239 Aguilar, et al. v. Felton, et al. 
No. 83-990 School District of Grand Rapids, et al. v. Ball, 
et al. ~t'K..~ ~'+~~~9r~ 
~ ,...~ .,~~ /t..I-4..:Z:. ~ 4.K~··~~ 
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Question Presented 
Whether the provision of supplemental instruction 
in nonpublic schools by public teachers, under the 
circumstances of these cases, violates the Establishment 


















A. Statutory Background 
(1) In Aguilar, the services furnished to students 
in nonpublic schools are authorized by Title I of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 u.s.c. 
§2701, et seq. , which declared it to be the pol icy of the 
United States to provide financial assistance to local 
educational institutions serving areas with concentrations 
of children from low-income families, in order to enable 
such institutions to meet the needs of educationally 
deprived children. Section 2740(a) provides that 
To the extent consistent with the number of 
educationally deprived children in the school 
district who are enrolled in p~1vate 
el~ntary and secondary schools, [the local 
educational agency] shall make ~ovision_ for 
including special educafionai services and 
ar ua enro lment, e ucational 
radio and television, and mobile educational 
services and equipment) in which such children can 
participate. Expenditures for educational 
services and arrangements pursuant to this section 
• • . shaU be egual (taking into account the 
number otc~o be served and the special 
educational needs of such children) to 
expenditures for children enrolled in the public 
schools of the local educational agency. 
Since 1966, New York City has been receiving federal funds 
Ll'lder Title I to finance programs wherein it sends public 
school teachers and other professionals into religious and 
other nonpublic schools to provide remedial instruction and 
clinical and guidance services to students. The City's 
initial Title I program required the students to travel to 
public schools after regular school hours for their remedial 
instruction; attendance lagged, however, and some programs 
were conducted in the nonpublic schools after hours. 
Attendance remained poor, and there was concern for the 
students • safety in travelling home after dark or in bad 
weather. A plan for students to participate in classes with 
public school students in public schools during the school 
day was rejected because of unspecified concerns about 
violating the New York Constitution. Consequently, the City ~...t..;$' 
devised the plan at issue here, of having public school fiL.4AA.; 
teachers travel to the nonpublic schools during the school 
day to provide instruction. 
(2) In Ball, Mich. Comp. Laws §380.1282 and its 
J;['edecessor provisions have authorized local public school 
districts to develop educational programs to meet local 
educational needs, and have authorized the payment of state 
school aid funds to local boards of education for provision 
of part-time instruction in supplementary subjects to 
students in nonpublic schools by public school teachers. 
Pursuant to this general authorization, the Grand Rapids 
School District ( "GRDS") set up the Shared Time and 
Community Education programs at issue in this case. Shared 
Time courses are offered in the nonpublic schools, during 
regular school hours, in classrooms leased to the GRDS. 
Although not required for graduation from the nonpublic 





instruction in core courses such as reading, math, art, 
music, and physical education. Many of the teachers 
employed by the GRDS had previously taught in the nonpublic 
schools. The Community Education program consisted of 
voluntary, leisure time offerings, available to interested 
students on the leased premises after hours. Most of the 
instructors taught in the nonpublic school during the day, 
but were hired as part-time public school employees to teach 
the Community Education courses after hours. 
B. Facts and Decisions Below 
(1) Aguilar: In 1976, the National Coalition for 
Public Education and Religious Liberty sued the Secretary of 
HEW and the Chancellor of the New York City Board of 
Education to enjoin New York City's program under Title I 
providing instruction in nonpublic schools as violative of 
the Establishment Clause. An evidentiary hearing producing 
an extensive factual record was held before a three-judge 
court, which ruled that the program was constitutional. 
~tional Coalition for Public Education & Religious Liberty 
("PEARL") v. Harris, 489 F. Supp. 1248 (SONY 1980). This 
Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction because 
it was untimely filed. 449 u.s. 808 (1980). Meanwhile, 
this action was brought by 6 federal taxpayers in DC in the 
EDNY, but was stayed pending final determination of PEARL. 
Four parents of children in nonpublic schools receiving 
remedial assistance intervened as defendants. The parties 
• ,.t. ... ._..'.; 
5. 
stipulated that the case was to be tried on the record 
developed in PEARL, with some supplementary affidavits. 
Judge Neaher agreed with the PEARL court's result, and 
dismissed the complaint. 
CA2 (Feinberg, Friendly, & Oakes) reversed. In 
what is one of the best Court of Appeals opinions I have 
ever read, the 
circumstances of this case and the relevant Supreme Court 
case law, and concluded that the program violated the 
I \ ~ 
Establishment Clause on the excessive entanglement prong of 
the test established by Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 
(1971), and its progeny. CA2 observed that although (1) New 
York City's program has been quite successful in achieving 
its goal of aiding educationally disadvantaged children, and 
. 
(2) the record revealed little actual evidence that the 
teachers had been unable to remain religiously neutral, the 
program violated the Clause because the continuing 
surveillance required to be sure that Title I teachers did 
not advance or inhibit religion was "not significantly 
<------------
different" this Court held in Meek v. 
Pittenger, 421 u.s. 349 (1975)' would lead to excessive 
entanglement. The court found the lack of evidence of 
actual misconduct by Title I teachers in the past to be 
irrelevant to the serious potential for such problems posed 
L~ 4-
by the structure of the program • 
(2) Ball: In August 1980, six individual 
taxpayers sued GRDS, the State Board of Education, and 
others in DC, challenging the provision of Shared Time and 
Community Education services on premises leased from 
religiously-oriented nonpublic schools in the Grand Rapids 
community. A group of parents with children in the programs 
intervened, and an 8-day trial was conducted before Judge 
Gibson in May 1982. At the close of the case, but before 
rendering a decision, Judge Gibson recused himself; the case 
was reassigned to Judge Enslen, who decided the case based 
on the documentary evidence and transcripts of testimony. 
He ruled that most of the programs violated the 
Establishment Clause. (The Drownproofing, Outdoor Education, 
and Driver's Education programs were sustained.) 
CA6 (Edwards and Lively) affirmed. Judge 
Krupansky dissented on the ground that the majority 
improperly ignored the "successful and fully documented 
cperational history" of the programs, concluding that 
because the record demonstrates no attempted or actual 
religious indoctrination of students by teachers in the 
rrograms, the majority • s rule amounts to a per se 
prohibition of secular instruction at sectarian 
mstitutions, a result she does not find compelled either by 
the First Amendment or by the case law. 
7. 
c. Relevant Case Law 
There are several cases decided by this Court ---involving the validity under the Establishment Clause of 
state aid to primarily religious nonpublic schools. A brief 
summary of the most relevant of these follows, as their 
reasoning will be central to decision of the cases at bar. 
/ 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602. (1971), the 
Court crystallized the now well-known three-part test that 
------------~ 
has been commonly used to analyse cases arising under the 
Establishment Clause; all parties in these two cases 
apparently agree that the test should be applied here. That 
test is that (i) the statute at issue must have a secular 
legislative purpose; (ii) the statute's primary effect must 
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and 
(iii) the statute must not foster "an excessive government 
entanglement" with religion. ~ at 612-613. To determine 
whether an excessive entanglement exists, the Court must 
look at (i) the character and purposes of the benefitted 
institution; (ii) the nature of the State aid provided; and 
(iii) the resulting relationship between the government and 
the religious authority. 
Lemon also made some general observations about 
the Establishment Clause and its purposes. Observing that 
the language of the Clause forbids laws "respecting" an 
establishment of religion, the Court ruled that a law may be 
invalid that falls short of actually establishing religion, 
if it is a "step that could lead to such establishment." 
o. 
Id., at 613. The classic warning in Establishment Clause 
cases has been against "'programs, whose very nature is <.!E.i_ 
to entangle the state in details of [religious] 
~
administration.'" !d., at 615 (quoting Justice Harlan's 
~parate opinion in ~alz v. Tax Commission, 397 u.s. 664, 
695 (1970) (emphasis added)). 
Lemon involved Rhode Island and Pennsylvania 
statutes authorizing state subsidization of religious 
schools in the form of supplements to the salaries of 
religious school teachers who taught secular subjects, and 
provision of textbooks and other instructional materials. 
The Court noted that the merits of the programs and their 
success in achieving the goals of improved education were 
not the issue; whether the programs were consistent with the 
First Amendment was the only important concern. Id. , at 
625. 
The Court ruled that supplementing teacher 
---------------~ 
salaries violated the Establishment Clause. The Court ______. 
reached this result even though teachers had testified that 
they had not injected religion into the secular subjects 
they taught. The Court noted that it need not assume that 
the teachers had been guilty of bad faith or conscious 
design to evade the statutory limitations implemented to 
accommodate the Establishment Clause; the potential for 
allowing religion to creep in was just too great. States 
are required to be certain that the teachers receiving 




teachers are not susceptible, like books, of a one-time 
inspection to be sure of their ideological character. (The 
teachers at issue in this case were religious school 
teachers, many of them nuns, although the Act required that -
the teacher agree to teach only secular subjects and not to 
teach any religious subjects as long as she received the 
salary supplements.) The Court considered that a 
"comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state 
surveillance [would] inevitably be required" to ensure that 
the statutory restrictions were obeyed. Id., at 619. Such 
surveillance would lead to an excessive government 
entanglement with the religious schools. 
finally, Lemon also considered that approving the 
~ograms would be likely to result in the sort of political 
divisiveness along religious lines that the Framers intended 
the First Amendment to prevent. Local elections would be 
permeated by the important issue of state aid to religious 
schools, and votes would be cast along religious lines. The 
situation would be aggravated by the need for continuing 
annual appropriations and larger demands as costs and 
p:>pulations grow. Id., at 622-623. 
In Committee for Public Education & Religious 
~ v. Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756 (1973), the Court concluded 
tha~ublic grants to nonpublic, primarily religious schools 
for maintenance and repair required to ens~tudent health 
and safety, and tuition reimbursement and tax deductions 
offered to parents of children in the nonpublic schools were 
invalid because they had a primary effect of advancing 
religion. In analyising the case, your opinion for the 
Cburt reaffirmed the three-part test discussed in Lemon. 
Your opinion noted that it has never been thought either 
p:>ssible or desirable to enforce a regime of total 
~paration between Church and State, id., at 760; some forms 
of aid may be channeled to the secular function of religious 
schools without providing prohibited direct aid to the 
rectarian, but "the channel is a narrow one," id., at 775. 
The Court concluded that the maintenance and repair 
provisions of the law were invalid as having an effect of 
advancing religion, because the law did not limit the 
provision of funds to portions of the facilities that were 
used for secular purposes. The Court noted that "a mere 
statistical judgment will not suffice as a guarantee that 
state funds will not be used to finance religious 
education"; after Lemon, the State must be certain that the 
funds will not be so used. Id., at 778-779. 
As to the tuition reimbursements and tax 
deductions, the Court noted that the fact that the aid was 
given to the parents and not directly to the school was not 
mspositive, but was only one factor to be considered. Id., 











one factor to be 
program violated 
cherished First Amendment values. Id., at 795. Finally, 
the Court considered the potential for political 
11. 
K -----------
· di~ls~e, as did the Lemon Court. 
The pressure for enlargement of the program was predictable 
and would lead to the type of political strife over 
religious issues was intended to 
prevent. !d., at 795-797. 
Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 u.s. 402 (1974), involved 
the scope of a State's duty under the federal Title I 
~ogram (at issue in Aguilar, at bar) to provide services to 
nonpublic school children comparable to those provided 
public school children under the Act. The decision 
expressly left open the validity under the Establishment 
Clause of Title I aid provided on the premises of religious 
schools. Your concurrence stated, however, that you "would 
have serious misgivings about the constitutionality of a 
statute that required the utilization of public school 
teachers in sectarian [Nyquist.]" Id. , at 
428. Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that any aid 
to religious schools--direct or indirect--violated the First 
Amendment. He admonished that in failing to invalidate the 
program, the Court had been improperly "seduced" by the 
laudable purpose of Title I of helping educationally 
deprived children. Id., at 429-430. 
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 u.s. 349 (1975), provides 
the closest factual analogy to the cases at bar. There, the 
Court considered Pennsylvania laws authorizing loans of 
textbooks and 
and p viding "auxiliary services" including counseling, 
lZ. 
therapy, and supplemental instruction for remedial and 
gifted students to students on the religious school 
premises, by public school employees. The loans of 
instructional materials were invalidated because unlik~ the 
loan of textbooks, which was upheld, the instructional 
rrater ials were lent to the schools, not to the students. 
The schools' religious and secular educational functions 
were inextricably inter twined, and the loans therefore had 
the primary effect of advancing religion. 
The Court ·ruled that the auxiliary services were 
invalid because they potentially would foster excessive 
-- --~· ) I entanglement and political divisiveness. The Court held 
that the DC had erred in relying on the "good faith and 
professionalism" of the auxiliary staff teachers and 
counselors to ensure that a nonideological posture was 
maintained. Id., at 369. The Court believed that the fact 
~at the teachers and counselors were public employees did 
not "substantially eliminate the need for continuing 
surveillance" noted in Lemon, which had involved religious 
s:hool teachers. Id., at 371. The schools they were 
visiting were dedicated to religious, as well as secular 
education, and the atmosphere of advancement of religion was 
constantly maintained. The "prophylactic contacts" 
necessary to ensure that the auxiliary staff played a 
nonideolog ical role would lead to an intolerable degree of 
entanglement, because under Lemon, the State must be certain 




fact that the danger of such conduct is less in a remedial 
math class than in medieval history does not matter; "a 
diminished probability of impermissible conduct is not 
sufficient." Id. 
In <alman v. Walter, 433 u.s. 229 (1977), the 
Court upheld various provisions of Ohio law, drafted 
~ecifically to conform to Meek, which authorized loans of 
instructional materials and textbooks, provision of testi~ 
in which nonpublic school personnel were not involved, 
provision of diagnostic services by employees of the public 
school system on nonpublic school premises, and other 
services. The diagnostic services were distinguished from 
the teachers and counselors in Meek on the ground that such 
services have little or no educational content, the 
diagnostician has only limited contact with the children 
tested, and the nature of the relationship does not lend 
itself to the transmission of sectarian views. You wrote a ~ 
separate opinion concurring in · part and dissenting in part ~ . 
in which you agreed that the diagnostic services should be 
upheld. You noted that this area of the law does not lend 
itself to "analytical tidiness," and that many of the 
Cburt's decisions must seem arbitrary. Id., at 262. You 
found merit in the "persistent desire of a number of States 
to find proper means of helping sectarian education to 
survive," and noted the benefit that parochial schools have 
provided. Id. You considered it important to note that the 
risk of religious control over the democratic process was no 
longer as significant as it was in the days of the Framers, 
and you viewed the risk of "deep political division along 
religious lines" to be "remote." Id., at 263. Any such 
risk seemed tolerable to you, given the benefit of sectarian 
schools and the continuing oversight of the Court. Id. 
II. Discussion 
The question of secular purpose is not at issue in 
either case--all parties in both cases agree that the 
programs at issue had a legitimate secular purpose. There 
is dispute in both cases about whether the programs have the 
effect of advancing religion; the primary issue in both 
cases, however, is whether the programs can be invalidated 
on enta~lement gro!.lJ1dS. Both cases involve schools that 
are primarily religious in nature; therefore, the 
entanglement issue turns largely on the nature of the aid 
provided and the resulting relationship between the 
government and the religious authority. I believe that this 
Court's prior decisions, discussed above, demonstrate that 
the programs in both cases are invalid on entanglement 




I agree completely with Judge Friendly's opinion 
in this case invalidating the Title I program on 
·. 
entanglement grounds. If Lemon, Nyquist, and Meek are still 1 
good law--and I have no reason to believe they are not--they 
compel the conclusion that the Title I program at issue here 
is unconstitutional. Appellants and the SG make much of the 
fact that Meek was decided on a meager factual record, while 
fue program at issue here had been in operation for 16 years 
and the extensive trial court record showed no evidence of 
improper behavior by the Title I teachers. Under Meek and 
~mon, however, these facts are unimportant. Although Meek 
may have been decided on a meager record, I find nothing in 
Justice Stewart • s opinion that so limits the decision in 
that case. Rather, it held flatly that a court is not 
entitled to rely on the "good faith and professionalism" of 
the teachers involved to be sure that no impermissible 
conduct occurs. This was so even though the teachers were 
public school employees rather than religious school 
reachers, as in Lemon. Moreover, the Lemon decision noted 
fuat the DC had made "extensive findings" on the 
entanglement issue, 403 U.s., at 615, and some teachers 
there had testified that they did not inject religion into 
their courses. Nonetheless, the Court held that it need 
not, and did not, assume that the teachers had been unable 
to remain neutral; the potential that they would be unable 
to do so was present, and the State was required by the 
First Amendment to be "certain" that no impermissible 
conduct occur red. Thus, although the lack of evidence in 
the record here of actual misconduct presents an emotionally 






appealing case for not invalidating the Title I program, 
under the decisions of this Court, that is not nearly 
enough. ~, Nyquist, supra, at 778 ("a mere statistical 
judgment will not suffice"}; Meek, supra, at 371 ("a 
diminished probability of impermissible conduct is not 
sufficient"}. 
The SG's argument centers around what a highly 
effective and beneficial program Title I has been, and how 
ineffective alternatives on-site instruction 
have proved to be. CA2 acknowledged the truth of this --------assertion and rightly stated that it was the overwhelming 
merit of the program that made this such a hard case. The 
merits of the particular program at issue, however, have 
never been deemed to be dispositive factors in determining 
its First Amendment validity. ~, Lemon, supra, at 625 
(the "merit and benefits of these schools . • • are not the 
issue before us," although the schools' "contribution has 
b:!en enormous"}. See also Nyquist, supra, at 795 
(admirable purposes of program only one factor to be 
considered) . In your se~on in~ you 
expressed the need to accommodate the government's laudable 
desire to aid nonpublic schools and what you viewed as the 
decreased risk of political divisiveness these days; 
oonetheless, the aid in Wolman was substantially different 
from the aid provided by New York's Title I program. The 
diagnosticians in Wolman were distinguished from teachers, 
which are involved in this case, on the ground of lessened 
contact with children, contact in a context unlikely to 
permit transmission of religious values, and a relationship 
much different from that of the one shared by teacher and 
mildren. None of those distinctions are applicable here. 
The SG argues that the safeguards undertaken in 
the program--of hiring public school teachers, of using 
rooms devoid of religious artifacts, the lack of 
reimbursement for use of the classroom space, supervision by 
field supervisors and the Board of Education--all serve to 
ensure that no religious instruction will be given by the 
Title I teachers. He also argues that the Title I program 
is governed by detailed regulations that have the effect of 
"routinizing" the relationship between the religious schools 
and the Title I program, thereby minimizing the need to 
worry about excessive entanglement. I do not find the SG's 
arguments persuasive. 
Meek ruled that the fact that the teachers 
involved there were public employees did not "substantially 
eliminate the need for continuing surveillance" that existed 
because the instruction was provided on the premises of the 
religious schools. 421 u.s., at 371. The "atmosphere 
dedicated to the advancement of religion" that the Meek 
Court found made continuing surveillance necessary seems to 
ITE to be no less present here just because certain rooms 
have been stripped of religious artifacts. Respondents 
argue--and it seems patently true--that occasional 
unannounced visits by supervisors cannot accurately prohibit 
improper religious inculcation or detect whether it has 
occurred. Moreover, the fact that the relationship between 
the Title I program administrators and the religious schools 
has become "routine" does not eliminate the need for 
surveillance: if anything, it may have the effect of making 
the need more apparent, as everyone will be less on guard to 
prevent improper conduct once the relationship becomes 
comfortable. The short answer is that Meek teaches that 
having public school teachers teach on the premises of 
religious schools presents a potential for impermissible 
conduct that is more heightened than if the instruction took 
place on a neutral site: it also held that the State must be 
certain that no such conduct occurred, something that could 
only be achieved by continuing surveillance. I can discern 
no substantial difference between this case and that one, 
and I would therefore recommend that you vote to affirm. 
The only way to reverse, it seems to me, is to 
change your view from that of the Meek opinion, which you 
joined. Your separate opinion in Wolman could be read as -leading toward that view, and certainly, in the abstract, it 
~ems a shame to invalidate what has been a very important 
and worthwhile program in New York City. (Indeed, in New 
York City, sending one's child to public school is not 
really an alternative in many areas, because many of the 
p..Iblic schools are just not safe.) On the other hand, as 
noted above, the programs upheld in Wolman are substantially 
~ . 
different from the program involved here. 
believe the case should be affirmed. 
B. Ball 
On balance, I 
For much the same reasons as those discussed 
above, I believe this case should be affirmed, as well. As 
in Aguilar, appellants stress the fact that the programs at 
issue have been in operation for a long time, and the 
extensive factual record developed in the DC showed no 
evidence that teachers providing the supplemental 
instruction were anything but neutral as to religion. As 
discussed above, however, Lemon and Meek lead to the 
conclusion that such evidence does not diminish the 
potential for impermissible conduct, and that it is 
therefore not dispositive. 
If anything, the facts of this case present a 
greater potential for improper conduct than do those in 
.Aguilar. Instead of public school teachers consistently 
being used, many of the teachers involved in the Shared Time 
program, and almost all of those involved in the Community 
Education program, are religious school teachers who have 
been hired by the public school to implement the programs. 
Moreover, the religious schools are paid by the private 
~hools to lease the classroom space used. Under Meek, I 
believe that the Grand Rapids programs must also be 
invalidated because of the potential for excessive 
government entanglement. 
c. Effect of Advancing Religion 
Appellants in both cases emphasize the facts that 
the instruction offered is supplementary, that the courses 
are not required by the religious schools as a condition of 
graduation, and that the programs were offered to the 
students, not to the nonpublic schools. The argument that 
the courses were offered to the students is a transparent, 
but unsuccessful attempt to fit within Meek. The religious 
schools were required to authorize provision of the courses 
in any particular school, and those schools decided which 
students would receive the instruction {with the possible 
~ception of the Community Education leisure time courses). 
Mbreover, in Meek, the DC had held that the auxiliary 
~rvices were provided to the children, not to the schools: 
yet the Court invalidated provision of the services. 
That the courses were supplementary and were not 
required for graduation does not mean that the religious 
schools were not being advanced thereby: especially with 
respect to the remedial instruction, the public programs 
were fulfilling a function that was evidently needed in the 
religious schools. By providing it to those schools, the 
public aid relieved the schools of an obligation they 
otherwise would have had if they were going to educate their 
students properly. Therefore, it appears to me that the 
programs at issue here advanced religion by substantially 
aiding the religious schools. 
Conclusion 
This Court has decided a long line of cases 
involving the validity under the Establishment Clause of 
public aid to nonpublic religious schools. Under the 
teachings of these cases, sending public school teachers to 
~ach on the premises of religious schools has always been 
viewed as presenting the potential for improper inculcation 
~
of religion by the teachers, prevention of which would 
require continuing surveillance of a degree that would 
amount to excessive government entanglement with the 
administration of the religious schools. In my view, the 
fact that there has been no evidence of past improper 
conduct by such teachers involved in these programs does not 
lessen the potential for it occurring in the future. The 
cases have all held that the potential is as important as 
the fact of improper conduct, for purposes of protecting 
First Amendment values, and the potential exists because of 
the structure of these programs which requires the public 
instruction to be provided on the premises of religious 
schools. Consequently, surveillance leading to entanglement 
would still be required in these cases to be "certain" that 
no impermissible conduct occurs, and the programs are 
therefore invalid under this Court's longstanding view of 
the Establishment Clause. I therefore recommend that you 
vote to affirm in both cases. 
~. ,, 
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Memorandum to File 
This is a summary memorandum based on a preliminary review 
of the opinion of CA 6 and the briefs of the parties. 
The Facts and the Issue 
This case involves Michigan law - in effect in one form 
or another for 60 years - that authorizes public school 
districts to assist in meeting the educational needs of all 
students, including both public and nonpublic school students. 
The programs at issue here are known as the Shared Time and 
Community Education courses. With one exception, only the 
operation of these programs at the elementary level is involved 
in this case. The summary of the facts set forth below are 
those found by the DC and accepted by CA 6 after a review of 
the record. 
The facts present an Establishment Clause issue. The 
plaintiffs (respondents here) are Michigan taxpayers and 
Americans United. The original defendants were the school 
district for the City of Grand Rapids and certain public educa-
tion officials. Some parents of children who benefited from the 
programs intervened. The two programs mentioned above, specif-
ically authorized in 1978, have grown from some 9,000 nonpublic 
school students enrolled at a cost to the State of $1,397,000. 
to more than 11,000 students at a cost of ~he State aid to 
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almost $6,000,000. Both programs operate under a standard 
form lease provided by the state. The lease, at nominal rentals, 
entitles the public schools to conduct these programs in the 
buildings of nonpublic schools (I will refer to the latter 
as "religious schools"). The leases do not restrict public school 
employees from using any of the facilities, though in practice 
specific classrooms are designated. All religious symbols 
are removed from the classrooms and - I believe from other 
areas used such as libraries. Signs are posted designating the 
particular class areas as "public school classrooms". The two 
programs, at the time of this case, employed 470 full and part-time 
teachers, a number of whom had taught in the religious schools 
previously - some in the same schools where these state sponsored 
classes were given. 
Shared Time is a program that offers substantive courses to 
religious school pupils during regular school hours. Courses 
included mathematics, reading, physical education and art. During 
the academic year 1981-82, 41 religious schools participated in the 
Grand Rapids Shared Time program. With the exception of physical 
education, industrial art, music and art, the educational oppor-
tunities offered through the program are supplementary to the 
core curriculum of religious schools. Apparently in some years 
courses in the humanities, Spanish, French, Latin, calculus, etc., 
have been offered. (It is not clear to me whether these quite 
substantive courses were offered during the period at issue in 
this case) . 
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There was testimony that 10 percent of the religious students' 
time during the academic year consisted of Shared Time instruction. 
The Community Education program differs primarily from Shared 
Time in that its classes are scheduled outside of the regular school 
hours. Courses included typing, business machines, computers, 
photography, retailing, bookkeeping, etc. These are voluntary 
courses, and a course is offered only if as many as 12 students 
sign up for it. A majority of the Community Education instructors 
are employed full time either by the religious school or the public 
school. My understanding is that Community Education instruction 
was offered after hours - and sometimes before opening - in both 
public and religious schools. Some 40 of the Grand Rapids' non-
public schools have participated in these programs. Most are 
Catholic, but a number are schools of other religious faiths. 
The Question Presented 
"Whether it constitutes a per se violation of the 
Establishment Clause for a local school district, 
as part of an enrichment and remedial educational 
program made available to all children in the dis-
trict, to provide - under public school control -
secular, supplementary, nonsubstitutionary courses 
of instruction to private school students on premises 
leased from religiously-oriented nonpublic schools." 
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Brief Discussion 
The opinions of the parties below address this case fully, 
and CA 6 affirmed the decision of the DC - with one judge dis-
senting. The United States - actually the Department of Labor -
is one of the respondents because Federal legislation provides for 
grants-in-aid to local educational agencies serving areas with 
concentrations of children from low-income families. See Title I 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. The Act 
specifically requires that provisions be made for the participa-
tion of eligible students who attend nonpublic schools. This case, 
however, does not involve a challenge to the Federal Act. It 
arises under Michigan law, but the SG argues that our decision 
will affect Federal law. 
The courts below and the parties debate the proper application 
of the several Establishment Clause cases decided by this Court. 
The primary focus - at least of the courts below - was on the 
three part test of Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
413 u.s. 756 (1973). Unless the state program meets each of these 
tests, it has been held to violate the Establishment Clause. The 
tests are: 
. '
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(i) The statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
(ii) Its principle or primary effect must neither advance nor 
inhibit religion (see Board of Education v. Allen, 392 
U.S. 2 36, 2 4 3) ; and 
(iii) The statute must not foster "an excessive Government 
intanglement with religion." See Waltz v. Tax Commission, 
397 u.s. 674. 
The DC agreed that the purpose of these programs clearly was 
"secular", and was not intended by the legislature to advance 
religion. The findings of the DC as to "secular" were found not 
to be clearly erroneous, and the facts were "affirmed". With 
respect to the second and third tests, "advances or inhibits 
religion" and "excessively intangles Government with religion", 
CA 6 found it "impossible completely to separate" the two in this 
case, and accordingly reviewed carefully the DC's findings with 
respect to each of them. CA 6 found the following factual con-
clusions to be correct: 
"The significant features which distinguish this 
present case from cases wherein the Supreme Court 
has not found violation of the establishment clause 
are these: First, this program is primarily a 
program of assistance to elementary schools; [l] 
second, this program is one which gives substantial 
financial aid to education in parochial school 
buildings; [2 ] third, the parochial schools 
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concerned have religious indoctrination as 
a primary school purpose; [ 3 ] fourth, the 
impact upon taxpayers and the parochial 
schools is direct. [ 4 ]" 
The Court of Appeals found the intanglement to be 
particularly serious, and concluded that these programs 
"clearly give direct aid to parochial schools in 
6. 
parochial school buildings. By doing so, they also assist 
those schools in performing their religious missions, in 
violation of the First Amendment." Pet. 40a 
Indeed, CA 6, despite a strong dissent, concluded that 
the continuation of these programs could "end public 
education as a major aspect of the American goal of equality 
of opportunity". It cited also my concurring opinion in 
Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 u.s. 402 at 419. I said that 
"I would have serious misgivings about the constitutionality 
of a statute that required the utilization of public school 
teachers in sectarian schools." 
The SG, in particular, argues strongly that these 
programs do not violate the Establishment Clause. They are 
said to be programs that "meet all of the requirements of the 
three part test." Relying on Mueller v . Allen (decided 
June 29, 1983), the SG thinks these "states have a legitimate 
interest in helping to improve the secular education of 
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students attending nonpublic schools". The SG also properly 
emphasizes that these particular programs serve the purpose 
of "enriching'' the educational program for the benefit of all 
children. They are characterized as being "secular, supplementary, 
nonsubstitutional courses of instruction". 
* * * 
These Establishment Clause cases are particularly difficult 
for me. Having been in public school education for 19 years 
in Virginia, I would hesitate to uphold state law that weakened 
the public school systems in any significant way. On the other 
hand, as I have said - I believe last Term and earlier - the 
private schools, including the church schools, are an important 
part of the American educational system. In some states they 
are essential - New York for example - where the population has 
major religious components. Moreover, on balance, the religious 
schools lessen the tax burden for the states, and they also 
provide competition that often is wholesome. 
Our cases generally - despite a good deal of weaving back and 
forth based on a variety of different types of aid - have 
recognized the importance of separation of church and state in 
our country. This is an importance rooted in the religious 
persecution suffered by many of the early settlers in this 
country. The history of religious faiths - as evidenced, for 
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example, by what is happening today in Iran, India, and perhaps 
other countries - makes clear that a religious influence in a 
country is not necessarily beneficial. Human rights often 
have been sacrificed on the "altar of religion". The founding 
fathers therefore were wise to provide for strict separation. 
Despite these views, I try to decide these cases on the 
basis of our prior authorities. I therefore need a careful 
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i'l~~,~- J'i 
- -- . . G:RAND RAPIDS SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY 
~ ~OF GRAND RAPIDS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
Jo ~ PHYLLIS BALLET AL. 
~- JCj' ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
/ . . , APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
?uj~/ ~> ~ - / q [April-, 1985] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The School District of Grand Rapids, Michigan, adopted 
P0v ~ two programs in which classes for nonpublic school students 
J• '' are financed by the public school system, taught by teachers 
~ _ 2 D hired by the public school system, and conducted in "leased" 
classrooms in the nonpublic schools. Most of the nonpublic 
~/- -?-e- schools involved in the programs are sectarian religious 
schools. This case raises the question whether these pro-
~' t~f- q.-- , grams impermissibly involve the government in the support 
 ~ ~ · of sectarian religious activities and thus violate the Establish-
~ & . ment Clause of the First Amendment. 
i<.J~- LO I 
--:-~ ~ ~ .a-r.- h9A ~..J 2.-o 
~ . p '-tr At issue in this case are the Community Education and 
(. ~...c.-J L- \ Shared Time programs offered in the nonpublic schools of 
---,' -- J Grand Rapids, Michigan. These programs, first instituted 
in the 1976-1977 school year, provide classes to nonpublic 
school students at public expense in classrooms located in and 
leased from the local nonpu~lic schools. 
Thershared Time program offers classes during the regular 
school di y that are intended to be supplementary to the "core 
curriculum" courses that the State of Michigan requires as a 
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part of an accredited school program. Among the subjects 
offered are "remedial" and "enrichment" mathematics, "re-
medial" and "enrichment" reading, art, music, and physical 
education. A typical nonpublic school student attends these 
classes for one or two class periods per week; approximately 
"ten percent of any given nonpublic school student's time 
quring the academic year would consist of Shared Time in-
struction." · 546 F. Supp. 1071, 1079 (W. D. Mich. 1982). 
Although S~elf is a program offered only in ..t}le 
no~b~ s~hoo~, there was testimony that the courses in-
clude<ITn £liafj)rogram are offered, albeit perhaps in a some-
what different form, in the public schools as well. All of the 
classes that are the subject of this case are taught in elemen-
tary schools, with the exception of Math Topics, a remedial 
math course taught in the secondary schools. 1 
The Shared Time teachers are full-time employees of the --public schools, who often move fro:riiClaSsroom to classroom 
during the course of the school day. A "significant portion" 
of the teachers (approximately 10%) "previously taught in 
nonpublic schools, and many of these had been assigned to 
the same nonpublic school where they were previously em-
ployed." I d., at 1078. The School District of Grand Rapids 
hires Shared Time teachers in accordance with its ordinary 
hiring procedures. Ibid. The public school system appar-
ently provides all of the supplies, materials, and equipment 
1 Shared Time and Community Education courses are taught at the ele-
mentary and secondary level in nonpublic schools. However, after the 
District Court found for respondents and enjoined the further operation of 
the programs, petitioners did not appeal the decision to the extent that it 
involved "physical education and industrial arts shared time classes at the 
secondary level and community education classes at the secondary level." 
App. 39. Thus, the appeal involved only Shared Time classes at the ele-
mentary level, Community Education classes at the elementary level, and 
the remedial math Shared Time class at the secondary level. 718 F. 2d, at 
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used in connection with Shared Time instruction. See App. 
341. I 
T ommunity Education Pro offered throughout 
the Gran ap"ds mmunity in schools and on other sites, 
for children as well as adults. The classes at issue here are 
taught in the nonpublic elementary schools and commence at 
the conclusion of there lar school day. Among the courses 
offeTeer are · rts and Crafts, Home Economics, Spanish, 
Gymnastics, Yearbook Production, Christmas Arts and 
Crafts, Drama, Newspaper, Humanities, Chess, Model 
Building, and Nature Appreciation. The IJlstrict Court 
found that "[a]lth~unity Education courses 
offered at nonpublic school sites are not offered at the public 
schools on a Community Education basis, all Community 
Education programs are otherwise available at the public 
schools, usually as a part of their more extensive regular 
curriculum." 546 F. Supp., at 1079. '-' 
Community Education teachers are'P.art-time public school 
-~e. -
e~. Community Education courses are completely 
v~ary and are offer~ only_ if twel~e or more stude~n­
roll. lfecause a well-known teacher 1s necessary to attract 
£he requisite number of students, the School District accords 
a preference in hiring to instructors already teaching within 
the school. Thus, "virtually every Community Education 
course conducted on facilities leased from nonpublic schools 
has an instructor otherwise employed'~ tim~'by the same 
nor}pUblic sc ool." 546 . upp., at 7 . 
~s are administered similarly. The Director 
of ~am, a public school employee, sends packets of 
course listings to the participating nonpublic schools before 
the school year begins. The nonpublic school administrators 
then decide which courses they want to offer. The Director 
works out an academic schedule for each school, taking into 
account inter alia the varying religious holidays celebrated 
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Non public school administrators decide which classrooms 
will be used for the programs, and the Director then inspects 
the facilities and consults with Shared Time teachers to make 
sure the facilities are satisfactory. The public school system 
pays the nonpublic schools for the use of the necessary class-
room space by entering into "leases" at the rate of $6 per 
classroom per week. The "leases," however, contain no 
mention of the particular room, space, or facility leased and 
teachers' rooms, libraries, lavatories, and similar facilities 
are made available at no additional charge. Id., at 1077. 
Each room used in the programs has to be free of any cruci-
fix, religious symbol, or artifact, although such religious sym-
bols can be present in the adjoining hallways, corridors, and 
other facilities used in connection with the program. During 
the time that a given classroom is being used in the pro-
grams, the teacher is required to post a sign stating that it is 
a "public school classroom." 2 However, there are no signs 
posted outside the school buildings indicating that public 
school courses are conducted inside or that the facilities are 
being used as a public school annex. 
Although petitioners label the Shared Time and Commu-
nity Education students as "part time public school stu-
dents," the students attending Shared Time and Community 
Education courses in facilities leased from a nonpublic school 
are the same students who attend that particular school oth-
erwise. I d., at 1078. There is no evi.9._ence that any public 
school stude t has ever attended a Shared Time or Commu-
ruty Education class in a on ublic school. I d., at 1 97. 
The District Court found that "[t]hough efendants claim the 
Shared Time program is available to all students, the record 
is abundantly clear that only nonpublic school students wear-
2 The signs read as follows: "Grand Rapids Public Schools' Room. This 
room has been leased by the Grand Rapids Public School District, for the 
purpose of conducting public school educational programs. The activity in 
this room is controlled solely by the Grand Rapids Public School District." 
App. 200. 
83-9~0PINION 
GRAND RAPIDS SCHOOL DISTRICT v. BALL 5 
ing the cloak of a 'public school student' can enroll in it." 
Ibid. The District Court noted that "[ w ]hereas public school 
students are assembled at the public facility nearest to their 
residence, students in religious schools are assembled on the 
basis of religion without any consideration of residence or 
school district boundaries." Id., at 1093. Thus, "beneficia-
ries are wholly designated on the basis of religion," ibid. , and 
these "public school" classes, in contrast to ordinary public 
school classes which are largely neighborhood-based, are as 
segregated by religion as are the schools at which they are 
offered.3 
Forty of the forty-one schools at which the programs oper-
ate~er.4 The schools of course vary 
from one another, but substantial evidence suggests that 
they share deep religious urposes. For instance, the Par-
ent Han oo o one atholic school states the goals of Cath-
olic education as "[a] God oriented environment which perme-
ates the total educational program," "[a] Christian 
atmosphere which guides and encourages participation in the 
church's commitment to social justice," and "[a] continuous 
development of knowledge of the Catholic faith, its tradi-
tions, teachings and theology." I d., at 1080. A policy state-
ment of the Christian schools similarly proclaims that "it is 
not sufficient that the teachings of Christianity be a separate 
subject in the curriculum, but the Word of God must be an 
all-pervading force in the educational program." I d., at 
1081. These Christian schools require all parents seeking to 
enroll their children either to subscribe to a particular doc-
trinal statement or to agree to have their children taught ac-
3 As would be expected, a large majority of the students attending reli-
gious schools belong to the denomination that controls the school. The 
District Court found, for instance, that approximately 85 percent of the 
students at the Catholic schools are Catholic. 546 F. Supp., at 1080. 
• Twenty-eight of the schools are Roman Catholic, seven are Christian 
Reformed, three are Lutheran, one is Seventh Day Adventist, and one is 
Baptist. 
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cording to the doctrinal statement. The District Court 
found that the schools are "pervasively sectarian," id., at 
1096 n. 13, and concluded "without 1iesltationthat the pur-
poses of these schools is to advance their particular reli-
gions," id., at 1096, and that "a substantial portion of their 
functions are subsumed in the religious mission." I d., at 
1084. 
B 
Re~on~ts are si,?c taxpa~s who filed suit against the 
School District of Grand Rapids and a number of state offi-
cials. They charged that the Shared Time and Community 
Education programs violated the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment of the Constitution, made applicable to 
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Everson v. 
Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947). After an 8-day 
bench trial, the District Court entered a judgment on the 
merrrs-on-behalf of respondents and enjoined further opera-
tion of the program. 5 
Applying the familiar three-part purpose, effect, and en-
tanglement test set out inlemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 
(1971), the court held that, although the ~ose of the pro-
grams was secular, their e~t was "distinctly impermissi-
ble." 546 F~pp., at 1093. The court relied in particular 
5 Petitioners alleged that respondents lacked taxpayer standing under 
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968), and Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U. S. 464 
(1982). The District Court and the Court of Appeals rejected the standing 
challenge. We affirm this finding, relying on the numerous cases in which 
we have adjudicated Establishment Clause challenges by state taxpayers 
to programs for aiding nonpublic schools. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 
433 U. S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland, 426 
U. S. 736, 744 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 355, n. 6 (1975); 
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for Public Education v. 
Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 762 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 735 
(1973); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U. S. 472, 478 
(1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 608, 611 (1971); Everson v. 
Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 3 (1947). 
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on the fact that the programs at issue involved publicly pro-
vided instructional services that served nonpublic school stu-
dents segregated largely by religion on nonpublic school 
premises. The court also noted that the programs conferred 
"direct benefits, both financial and otherwise, to the sectar-
ian institutions." 546 F. Supp., at 1094. Finally, the court 
found that the programs necessarily entailed an unacceptable 
·1evel of entanglement, both political and administrative, be-
tween the public school systems and the sectarian schools. 
Petitioners appealed the judgment of the District Court to 
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Aiiaided ~_nel 
of the ~ed. 718 F. 2 1 89 (1983). 




The First Amendment's guarantee that "Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion," as our 
cases demonstrate, is more than a pledge that no single reli-
gion will be designated .;is a state religion. Committee for 
Public Education v. vNyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 771 (1973); 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961). It is also more than a 
mere injunction that governmental programs discriminating 
among religions are unconstitutional. See, e. g., School Dis-
trict of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 
216-217 (1963); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 
203, 211 (1948). The Establishment Clause instead primar-
ily proscribes "sponsorship, firiaiiCial support, and ac.J;We in-
volvement of the sovereign in religious activity." vNyquist, 
supra, at 772; see also Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 
664, 668 (1970). As Justice Black, writing for the Court in 
Everson v. Board of Education, supra, at 15-16 (1947), 
stated: "Neither [a state nor the Federal Government] can 
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer 
one religion over another. . . . No tax in any amount, large 
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or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or 
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form 
they may adopt to teach or practice religion." 
Since Everson made clear that the guarantees of the 
Establishment Clause apply to the States, we have often 
grappled with the problem of state aid to non ublic, religious 
schools. n all of these cases, our goal has been to give 
··~ng to the sparse language and broad purposes of the 
Clause, while not unduly infringing on the ability of the 
States to prov1 e or e we are o e1r eople in accordance 
with their own particular circumstances. roviding for the ;· 
education of schoolchildren is surely a praiseworthy purpose. 
But our cases have consistently recognized that even such a 
praiseworthy, secular purpose cannot validate ~vernment 
aid to parochial schools when the a1d lias tfie e?rect of r ot-
~ a Siiigle religion or religion generall 0 ~un­
~ ~s the government in matters religious. For 
just as religion throughout history has provided spiritual 
comfort, guidance, and inspiration to many, it can also serve 
powerfully to divide societies and to exclude those whose be-
liefs are not in accord with particular religions or sects that 
have from time to time achieved dominance. The solution to 
this problem adopted by the Framers and consistently recog-
nized by this Court is jealously to guard the right of every 
individual to worship according to the dictates of conscience 
while re uirin the overnment to maintain a course of neu-
tralit~ !!_mQ!!K_ religiQ!!_s, ~ etween re igiQn and non-
religion. Only in this way can we "make room for as wide a 
variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man 
deem necessary" and "sponsor an attitude on the part of gov-
ernment that shows no partiality to any one group and lets 
each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the ap-
peal of its dogma." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 313 
(1952). 
We have noted that the three-part test first articulated in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 612-613, guides "[t]he 
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general nature of our inquiry in this area," Mueller v. Allen, 
463 u.s. 783,- (1983): 
Every analysis in this area must begin with consider-
ation of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court 
over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned 
from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular 
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary ef-
fect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 243 
(1968); finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.' Walz [v. Tax 
Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970)]." Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613. 
These tests "must not be viewed as setting the precise limits 
to the necesesary constitutional inquiry, but serve only as 
guidelines with which to identify instances in which the ob-
jectives of the Establishment Clause have been impaired." 
/ Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 359 (1975). We have par-
ticularly relied on Lemon in every case involving the sensi-
tive relationship between government and religion in the 
education of our children. The government's activities in 
this area can have a magnified impact on impressionable 
young minds, and the occasional rivalry of parallel public and 
private school systems offers an all-too-ready opportunity for 
divisive rifts along religious lines in the dy politic. See 
Committee for Public Education quis , supra, at 796-
798; Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 6 -624. 
As has often been true in school aid cases, there is no dis-
pute as to the first test. Both the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals found that the PEPO..§.e of the Community 
Education and Shared Time programs was "m~u­
lar." 546 F. Supp., at 1085; see also 718 F. 2d, at 1398. We 
fui'a no reason to disagree with this holding, and therefore go 
on to consider whether the primary or principal effect of the 
challenged programs is to advance or inhibit religion. 
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B 
Our inquiry must begin with a consideration of the nature 
of the institutions in which the programs operate. Of the 41 
private schools where these "part time public schools" have 
operated, 40 are identifiably religious schools. It is true that 
each school may not share all of the characteristics of reli-
gious schools as articulated, for example, in the complaint in 
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 356 (1975); see also Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 615. The District Court found, ,6 C ;:,-
however, that "[b]ased upon the massive testimony and ex- .IA~J ~~""' 
hibits, the conclusion is inescapable that the religious institu- r-~ 
tions receiving instructional services from the public schools 
are sectarian in the sense that a substantial portion of their 
functions are subsum~ in the religious mission." 546 F. 
Supp., at 1096; see '1Iunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 735 
(1973); Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 364-365 ("[t]he very pur-
pose of many of those schools is to provide an integrated sec-
ular and religious education); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 
U. S., at 671 ("to assure future adherents to a particular · 
faith" is "an affirmative if not dominant policy of church 
schools"). At the religious schools here-as at the sectarian 
schools that have been the subject of our past cases-"the 
secular education those schools provide goes hand in hand 
with the religious mission that is the only reason for the 
schools' existence. Within that institution, the two are inex-
tricably intertwined." 6 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 
6 The elementary and secondary schools in this case differ substantially 
from the colleges that we refused to characterize as "pervasively sec-
tarian" in Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U. S. 736, 
755-759 (1976). See also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). Many of the schools in this case include 
prayer and attendance at religious services as a part of their curriculum, 
are run by churches or other organizations whose members must subscribe 
to particular religious tenets, have faculties and student bodies composed 
largely of adherents of the particular denomination, and give preference in 
attendance to children belonging to the denomination. 546 F. Supp. , at 
1080-1084. 
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657 (Opinion of BRENNAN, J.). See also Meek v. Pittenger, 
supra, at 365-366; Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 
236, 245, 247-248 (1968). 
Given that forty of the forty-one schools in this case are 
thus "pervasively sectarian," the challenged public-school 
programs opera tin in the reli · ous sc oo s may 1m ermissi-
bl~-~_!_i~n in three differenLFays. Firs t e 
teachers participating in the programs may become mvolved 
in intentionally or inadvertently inculcating particular reli-
gious tenets or beliefs. ~' the programs may provide a 
crucial symbolic link between government and religion, 
thereby e nlistmg- at least in the eyes of impressionable 
youngsters-the powers of government to th~ort of the 
religious denomination operating the school. ~' the pro-
grams may have the effect of directly promotm_g religiog by 
impermisSibly pr'oVi<Iifig a suf>sidy to the primary religious 
mission o th ms 1 u 1on 
(1) 
Although Establishment Clause jurisprudence is charac-
terized by few absolutes, th~use does absolute! rqhibit 
~ Gov~men~financed or Government-sponsored indoctrina-
tiq_n into .t.he beliefs of a _particular religious faith. See Stone 
v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam); Meek v. 
Pittenger, 421 U. S., at 370; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., 
at 619 ("The State must be certain, given the Religion 
Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion."); 
Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U. S. 472, 480 
(1973) ("[T]he State is constitutionally compelled to assure 
that the state-supported activity is not being used for reli-
gious indoctrination"); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 429 
(1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S., at 314 ("Government 
may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious in-
struction nor blend secular and sectarian education . . .. "). 
Such indoctrination, if permitted to occur, would have devas-
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detennine what to believe (and what not to believe) free of 
any coercive pressures from the State, while at the same 
time tainting the resulting religious beliefs with a corrosive 
secularism. 
In Meek v. Pittenger, supra, the Court invalidated a stat-
ute providing for the loan of state-paid professional staff-
including teachers-to nonpublic schools to provide remedial 
and accelerated instruction, guidance counseling and testing, 
and other services on the premises of the nonpublic schools. 
Such a program, if not subjected to a "comprehensive, 
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance," Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 618-619 (quoted in Meek, supra, at 
370), would entail an unacceptable risk that the the state-
sponsored instructional personnel would "advance the reli-
gious mission of the church-related schools in which they 
serve." Meek, supra, at 370. Even though the teachers 
were paid by the State, "[t]he potential for impermissible fos-
tering of religion under these circumstances, although some-
what reduced, is nonetheless present." !d., at 372. The 
program in Meek, if not sufficiently monitored, would simply 
have entailed too great a risk of state-sponsored 
indoctrination. 
The programs before us today share the defect that we 
identified lnM e~ With respec o t e ommunity Educa-
tion ogram, the District Court found that "virtu~ry ( 
Communit Education course conducted on facilities leased 
from nonpu · c schools has an instructor otherwise emplo~d 
fu.l!.-.ti!!1e y e same nonpu 1c school." 546 F. Supp., at 
1079. These Tnstructors, many of Whom no doubt teach in 
the religious schools precisely because they are adherents of 
the controlling denomination and want to serve their reli-
gious community zealously, are expected during the regular 
school day to inculcate their students with the tenets and be-
liefs of their particular religious faiths. Yet the premise of 
the program is that those instructors can put aside their reli-
gious convictions and engage in entirely secular Community 
83-990--0PINION 
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Education instruction as soon as the school day is over. 
Moreover, they are expected to do so before the same reli-
gious-school students and in the same religious-school class-
rooms that they employed to advance religious purposes dur-
ing the "official" school day. Nonetheless, as petitioners 
themselves asserted, Community Education classes are not 
specifically monitored for religious content. App. 353. 
We do not question that the dedicated and professional re-
ligious school teachers employed by the Community Educa-
tion program will attempt in good faith to perform their secu-
lar mission conscientiously. Cf. Lemon, 403 U. S., at 
618-619. Nonetheless, there is a substantial risk that, 
overtly or subtly, the religious message they are expected to 
convey during the regular school day will infuse the suppos-
edly secular classes they teach after school. The danger 
arises "not because the public employee [is] likely deliber-
ately to subvert his task to the service of religion, but rather 
because the pressures of the environment might alter his be-
havior from its normal course." Wolman v. Walter, 433 
U. S. 229, 247 (1977). "The conflict of functions inheres in 
the situation." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 617. 
The Shared Time program, though structured somewhat ( 
differently, nonetheless also poses a substantial risk of state-
sponsored indoctrination. The most important difference 
between the programs is that most of the instructors in the 
Shared Time program are full-time teachers hired by the 
public schools. Moreover, although "virtually every" Com-
munity Education instructor is a full-time religious school 
teacher, 546 F. Supp., at 1079, only "[a] significant portion" 
of the Shared Time instructors previously worked in the reli-
gious schools. 7 I d., at 1078. Nonetheless, as with the 
Community Education program, no attempt is made to moni-
7 Approximately 10% of the Shared Time instructors were previously 
employed by the religious schools, and many of these were reassigned back 
to the school at which they had previously taught. 
.. 
83-990-0PINION 
14 GRAND RAPIDS SCHOOL DISTRICT v. BALL 
tor the Shared Time courses for religious content. App. 
330.8 
Thus, despite these differences between the two programs, 
our holding in Meek controls the inquiry with respect to 
Shared Time, as well as Community Education. Shared 
Time instructors are teaching academic subjects in religious 
l3chools in courses virtually indistinguishable from the other 
courses offered during the regular religious-school day. The 
teachers in this program, even more than their Community 
Education colleagues, are "performing important educational 
services in schools in which education is an integral part of 
the dominant sectarian mission and in which an atmosphere 
dedicated to the advancement of religious belief is constantly 
maintained." Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 371. Teachers 
in such an atmosphere may well subtly (or overtly) conform 
their instruction to the environment in which they teach, 
while students will perceive the instruction provided in the 
context of the dominantly religious message of the institu-
tion, thus reinforcing the indoctrinating effect. As we 
stated in Meek, "[w]hether the subject is 'remedial reading,' 
'advanced reading,' or simply 'reading,' a teacher remains a 
teacher, and the danger that religious doctrine will become 
intertwined with secular instruction persists." 421 U. S., at 
370. Unlike types of aid that the Court has upheld, such as 
state-created standardized tests, Committee for Public Edu-
cation v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646 (1980), or diagnostic services, 
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S., at 241-244, there is a "sub-
stantial risk" that programs operating in this environment 
would "be used for religious educational purposes." Com-
mitteefor Public Education v. Regan, supra, at 656. 
The Court of Appeals of course recognized that respond-
ents adduced no evidence of specific incidents of religious 
8 The public school system does include Shared Time teachers in its ordi-
nary teacher evaluation program, which subjects them to evaluation once 
each year during their first year of teaching and once every three years 
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indoctrination in this case. 718 F. 2d, at 1404. But the 
absence of proof of specific incidents is not dispositive. 
When conducting a supposedly secular class in the perva-
sively sectarian environment of a religious school, a teacher 
may knowingly or unwillingly tailor the content of the course 
to fit the school's announced goals. If so, there is no reason 
to believe that this kind of ideological influence would be de-
·tected or reported by students, by their parents, or by the 
school system itself. The students are presumably attend-
ing religious schools precisely in order to receive religious in-
struction. After spending the balance of their school day in 
classes heavily influenced by a religious perspective, they 
would have little motivation or ability to discern improper 
ideological content that may creep into a Shared Time or 
Community Education course. Neither their parents nor 
the parochial schools would have cause to complain if the ef-
fect of the publicly-supported instruction were to advance the 
sectarian mission. And the public school system itself has no 
incentive to detect or report any specific incidents of im-
proper state-sponsored indoctrination. Thus, the lack of evi-
dence of specific incidents of indoctrination is of little 
significance. 
(2) 
Our cases have recognized that the Establishment Clause 
guards against more than direct, state-funded efforts to in-
doctrinate youngsters in specific religious beliefs. Govern-
ment promotes religion as effectively when it fosters a close 
identification of its powers and responsibilities with those of 
any-or all-religious denominations as when it attempts to 
inculcate specific religious doctrines. If this identification 
conveys a message of government endorsement or disap-
proval of religion, a core purpose of the Establishment 
Clause is violated. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 103 S. Ct. 1355, 
1366 (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); cf. Abington School 
District v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 222 (history teaches that 
"powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion of gov-
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ernmental and religious functions or a concert or dependency 
of one upon the other to the end that official support of the 
State or Federal Government would be placed behind the te-
nets of one or of all orthodoxies"). As we stated in Larkin v. 
Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116, 125-126 (1983): "[T]he 
mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by 
Church and State provides a significant symbolic benefit to 
··religion in the minds of some by reason of the power con-
ferred." See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274 
(1982) (finding effect "incidental" and not "primary" because 
it "does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on reli-
gious sects or practices"). 
It follows that an important concern of the effects test is 
whether the symbolic union of church and state effected by 
the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be 
perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as 
an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, 
of their individual religious choices. The inquiry into this 
kind of effect must be conducted with particular care when 
many of the citizens perceiving the governmental message 
are children in their formative years. 9 Cf. Widmar v. Vin-
cent, supra, at 274; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 
685-686 (1971). The symbolism of a union between church 
and state is most likely to influence children of tender years, 
whose experience is limited and whose beliefs consequently 
are the function of environment as much as of free and volun-
tary choice. 
Our school-aid cases have recognized a sensitivity to the 
symbolic impact of the union of church and state. Grappling 
9 For instance, this Court has held that prayers conducted at the com-
mencement of a legislative session do not violate the Establishment 
Clause, in part because of long historical usage and lack of particular sec-
tarian content. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3336 (1983). But 
we have never indulged a similar assumption with respect to prayers con-
ducted at the opening of the school day. School District of Abington 
Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 103 (1963); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 
(1962). 
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with problems in many ways parallel to those we face today, 
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948), held 
that a public school may not permit part-time religious in-
struction on its premises as a part of the school program, 
even if participation in that instruction is entirely voluntary 
and even if the instruction itself is conducted only by nonpub-
Jic-school personnel. Yet in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 
306 (1952), the Courtheld that a similar program conducted 
off the premises of the public school passed constitutional 
muster. The difference in symbolic impact helps to explain 
the difference between the cases. The symbolic connection 
of church and state in the McCollum program presented the 
students with a graphic symbol of "the concert or union or 
dependency" of church and state, see Zorach, supra, at 312. 
This very symbolic union was conspicuously absent in Z orach 
program. 10 
In the programs challenged in this case, the religious 
school students spend their typical school day moving be-
tween religious-school and "public-school" classes. Both 
types of classes take place in the same religious-school build-
ing and both are largely composed of students who are adher-
ents of the same denomination. In this environment, the 
students would be unlikely to discern the crucial difference 
between the religious-school classes and the "public-school" 
classes, even if the latter were successfully kept free of reli-
gious indoctrination. As one commentator has written: 
This pervasive [religious] atmosphere makes on the 
young student's mind a lasting imprint that the holy and 
transcendental should be central to all facets of life. It 
increases respect for the church as an institution to guide 
one's total life adjustments and undoubtedly helps stimu-
1°Compare Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367-373 (1975) (invalidat-
ing program providing for state-funded remedial services on religious-
school premises) with Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 244-248 (1977) 
(upholding program providing for similar services at neutral sites off the 
premises of the religious school). 
. ' 
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late interest in religious vocations. . . . In short, the 
parochial school's total operation serves to fulfill both 
secular and religious functions concurrently, and the two 
cannot be completely separated. Support of any part of 
its activity entails some support of the disqualifying reli-
gious function of molding the religious personality of the 
young student. Giannella, "Religious Liberty, Non-
establishment and Doctrinal Development: Part II. 
The Nonestablishment Principle," 81 Harv. L. Rev. 513, 
574 (1968). 
Consequently, even the student who notices the "public 
school" sign 11 temporarily posted would have before him a 
powerful symbol of state endorsement and encouragement of 
the religious beliefs taught in the same class at some other 
time during the day. 
As Judge Fr ien,!lly, writing for the Second Circuit in the 
comparuon case to the case at bar, stated: 
Under the City's plan public school teachers are, so far 
as appearance is concerned, a regular adjunct of the reli-
gious school. They pace the same halls, use classrooms 
in the same building, teach the same students, and con-
fer with the teachers hired by the religious schools, 
many of them members of religious orders. The reli-
gious school appears to the public as a joint enterprise 
staffed with some teachers paid by its religious sponsor 
and others by ~he public. 739 F. 2d, at 68-69. 
This effect-the symbolic union of government and religion in 
one sectarian enterprise-is an impermissible effect under 
the Establishment Clause. 
(3) 
Everson . Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947), the 
Court stated that "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can 
be levied to su ort~ties or institutiOnS; 
11 See note 2, supra . 
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whatever thay may be called, or whatever form they may 
adopt to teach or practice religion." !d., at 16. With but 
one exception, our subsequent cases have struck down at-
tempts by States to rna e payments out of ublic tax dollars 
directl~ry or secon ary re igious educa wna mstitu-___..._, 
tions:- See, e. g., Committee for Public Education v. 
V:Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 774-781 (reimbursement for mainte-
nan~ a~pair exp_en~es); Levitt v. Committee for Public 
Education, 413 U. S. 472 (1973) (reimbursement for teacher-
prepared tests); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971) 
(salary supplements for nonpublic school teachers). But see 
Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646 
(1980) (permitting public subsidy for certain routinized 
recordkeeping and testing services performed by nonpublic 
schools but required by state law). 
As~nts, the C£_urt has distinguished be-
tween two cate aries of ro a in which public funds are 
used to finance secular activities that religious schools would 
otherwise fund from their own resources. In the first cate-
gory, the Court has noted that "it is well established . . . that ) 
not every law that confers an 'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'inci-
dental' benefit upon religious institutions is, for that reason 
alone, constitutionally invalid." Committee for Public E du-
cation v. N1J!l.ui_§t, supra, at 771; Roemer v. Maryland Pub-
lic Works Board, 426 U. S. 736, 747 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 
413 U. S. 734, 742-743 (1973). In such "indirect" aid cases, 
the government has used primarily secular means to accom-
plish a primarily secular end, and no "primary effect" of 
advancing religion has thus been found. On this rationale, 
the Court has upheld programs providing for loans of secular 
textbooks to nonpublic school students, BoardO/Eau;atfun 
v. Allen, supra; see also Wolman v. Walter,433 U. S., at 
236-238; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S., at 359-362, and pro-
grams providing b!!_s ~an~tion for nonpublic school chil-
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In the second category of cases, the Court has relied on the 
Establishment Clause prohibition of forms of aid that provide 
"direct and substantial advancement of the sectarian enter-
prise. olman v. a ter, supra, at 250. In such "direct 
aid" cases, the government, although acting for a secula.IlJtlr-
pOse,1i'a'S done so by directly supporting a reli · ous institu-
tion. Under IS ra 10na e, e ou as struck dowt;' state 
··senemes providing for tuition grants and tax benefits for par-
ents whose chi dren a en re g~ous sc oo , see oan v. 
Lemon, 413 U. S. 825 (1973); Committee for Public Educa-
tion v. Nyquist, supra, at 780-794, and programs providing 
for "loan~structional materials to be used in religious 
schools, see Wolman v. Walter, supra, at 248-251; Meek v. 
Pittenger, supra, at 365. In Sloan and Nyquist, the aid was 
fo~give11 !2~a!~nts an~to the rehg~ous 
schools~ W11ileTn WOlman and Meek, the aid was in-kind as-
sistance rather than the direct contribution of public funds. 
Nonetheless, these differences in form were insufficient to 
save ro ams whose effect was indistinguishable from that 
of ..direct subsi y o the religious school. 
us, the o _ as never accETI,>ted the mere possibili_llr of 
subsidization;as-uie above cases demonstrate, as sufficient-to 
i~an _,aid _J!rqgr,flm. On the other hand, this effect is 
no whol y ummportant for Establishment Clause purposes. 
l 
If it were, the public schools could aduall take on them-
selVeS the entire responsibility for teachin secular su · ects 
on ~lig!gus_ scE-0~1 ~~es. he question in each case must 
bewnetner'tlleeliect OI J he ,Erot'rered .ru,d IS "l'ld1rect and sub-
stantial," Com~or Public Education v. Nyquist, 
sup:;a, at 784 n. 39, or indirect and incidental.'2 "The prob-
12 This "indirect subsidy" effect only evokes Establishment Clause con-
cerns when the public funds flow to "an institution in which religion is so 
pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the 
religious mission .. . "Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 743 (1973). In this 
case, the District Court explicitly found that forty of the forty-one partici-
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lem, like many problems in constitutional law, is one of 
degree." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S., at 314. __. 
--wehave noted in the past that the religious school has dual 
functions, providing its students with a secular education 
while it promotes a particular religious perspective. See 
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 783, -, [103 S. Ct. 3062, 3070] 
(1983); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 248 
""(1968). In Meek and Wolman, we held unconstitutional 
state programs providing for loans of instructional equipment 
and materials to religious schools, on the ground that the pro-
grams advanced the "primary, religion-oriented educational 
function of the sectarian school." Meek, supra, at 364; 
Wolman, supra, at 248-251. Cf. Wolman, supra, at 243 
(upholding provision of diagnostic services, which were 
"'general welfare services for children that may be provided 
by the State regardless of the incidental benefit that accrues 
to church-related schools,"' quoting Meek, supra, at 371 
n. 21). The programs challenged here, which provide teach-
ers in addition to the instructional equipment and materials, 
have a similar-and forbidden-effect of advancing religion. 
This kind of direct aid t e educational function of the reli-} ~ 
gious school is ind1stinguisliable from the provision of a direct A~ ../.A ~ 
1 
/ f-
c~sh s~ to t e rehg~ous sc oo t at IS most clearly pro-  
hifiitea under the Establishment Clause. ~ a__ 
Petitioners claim that the aid here, like the textbooks in 
Allen, flows primarily to the students, not to the religious ~ ~ 
schools. 13 Of course, all aid to religious schools ultimately 
"flows to" the students, and petitioners' argument if accepted 
would validate all forms of non-ideological aid to religious 
Supp., at 1080. For this reason, the inquiry into whether the aid is "direct 
and substantial" is necessary. 
18 Petitioners also cite Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983), which 
upheld a general tax deduction available to parents of all school children for 
school expenses, including tuition to religious schools. Mueller, however, 
is quite unlike the instant case. Unlike Mueller, the aid provided here is 
unmediated by the tax code and the "numerous, private choices of individ-
ual parents of school-age children." !d., at 3069. 
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schools, including those explicitly rejected in our prior cases. 
Yet in Meek, we held unconstitutional the loan of instruc-
tional materials to religious schools and in Wolman, we re-
jected the fiction that a similar program could be saved by 
masking it as aid to individual students. Wolman, supra, 
433 U. S., at 249, n. 16. It follows a fortiori that the aid 
here, which includes not only instructional materials but;'lso 
· ·t~ieprovisiOn o instructional services b teachers in the 
] 
paroc Ia scfioo DUI i:lmg, "inescapably [has] the primary ef-
fect of providing a direct and substantial advancement of the ( 
sectarian enterprise." !d., at 250. Where, as here, no 
meaningful distinction can be made between aid to the stu-
dent and aid to the school, "the concept of a loan to indiYid-
uals ~n." Wolmanv. Walter, 433 U. S. 
229, 264 (opinion of POWELL, J.). 
Petitioners also argue that this "subsidy" effect is not sig-
nificant in this case, because the Community Education and 
Shared Time programs supplemented the curriculum with 
courses not previously offered in the religious schools and not 
required by school rule or state regulation. Of course, this 
fails to distinguish the programs here from those found un-
constitutional in Meek. See 421 U. S., at 368. As in Meek, 
we do not find that this feature of the program is controlling. 
First, there is no way of knowing whether the religious 
schools would have offered some or all of these courses if the 
public school system had not offered them first. The distinc-
tion between courses that "supplement" and those that "sup-
plant" the regular curriculum is therefore not nearly as clear 
as petitioners allege. Second, although the precise courses 
offered in these programs may have been new to the partici-
pating religious schools, their general subject matter-read-
ing, math, etc.-was surely a part of the curriculum in the 
past, and the concerns of the Establishment Clause may thus 
be triggered despite the "supplemental" nature of the 
courses. Cf. Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 370-371. Third, 
and most important, petitioners' argument would permit the 
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public schools gradually to take over the entire secular 
curriculum of the religious school, for the latter could surely 
discontinue existing courses so that they might be replaced a 
year or two later by a Community Education or Shared Time 
course with the same content. The average religious school 
student, for instance, now spends 10% of the school day in 
Shared Time classes. But there is ~on } 
·which this Court can impose a limit n h cent e of the ~  
religious-school day that can be subsidized b the ic 
sc~enie out o the ot e in this case would 
be to permit ever larger segments of the religious school 
curriculum to be turned over to the public school system, 
thus violating the cardinal principle that the State may not in J 
effect become the prime supporter of the religious school sys-
tem. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 624-625. 
III 
We conclude that the challenged programs have the effect 
of promoting religion in three ways. 14 The state-paid in-
structors, influenced by the pervasively sectarian nature of 
the religious schools in which they work, may subtly or 
overtly indoctrinate the students in particular religious 
tenets at public expense. The symbolic union of church and 
state inherent in the provision of secular, state-provided in-
struction in the religious school buildings threatens to convey 
a message of State support for religion to students and to the 
general public. Finally, t~rograms in effect subsidize the l 
''reli · o nctions" of the parochial schools by taking over a 
substantia o 1on o e1r responsibility for ~ar 
sub ec s. or t ese reaso s, e cone us1on 1s mescapa le 
tnafthe Community Education and Shared Time programs 
have the "primary or principal" effect of advancing religion, 
1
' Because of this conclusion, we need not detennine whether aspects of 
the challenged programs impennissibly entangle the government in reli-
gious matters, in violation of the third prong of the Lemon test. But see 
Aguilar v. Felton, - U. S. - (1985). 
·. 
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and therefore violate the dictates of the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment. 
N onpublic schools have played an important role in the I 
development of American education, and we have long recog-
nized that parents and their children have the right to choose 
between public schools and available sectarian alternatives. 
As the CHIEF JuSTICE noted in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
·u. S., at 625, "nothing we have said can be construed to dis-
parage the role of church-related elementary and secondary 
schools in our national life. Their contribution has been and 
is enormous." But the Establishment Clause "rest[s] on the 
belief that a union of government and religion tends to de-
stroy government and to degrade religion." Engel v. Vitale, 
370 U. S. 421, 431 (1962). Therefore, "[t]he Constitution de-
crees that religion must be a private matter for the individ-
ual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and 
that while some involvement and entanglement are inev-
itable, lines must be drawn." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 
at 625. Because "the controlling constitutional standards 
have become firmly rooted and the broad contours of our in-
quiry are now well defined," Committee for Public Educa-
tion v. Nyqu~t, 413 U. S., at 761, the position of those lines 
has by now become quite clear and requires affirmance of the 
Court of Appeals. 
It is so ordered. 
lgs April 2, 1985 
Lr-da... - a-.. 7~--t ~ ~ ~ 
~~~- -~ 1-JA-~,/:;J.A._f 
~~4~ ~ ~w~;;; 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda 
Re: No. 83-990 Grand Rapids School District v. Ball 
Nos. 84-237, 84-238, 84-239 Aguilar v. Felton 
Justice Brennan's drafts in these two school-aid 
religion cases are now in, and I am quite pleased with them, 
overall. Both opinions are quite straightforward and deal with 
this Court's precedent fairly and thoroughly. On the basis of 
accuracy and result, you could easily join both opinions as they 
now stand. 
In fact, I have no reservations about the opinion in 
Grand Rapids, and I do recommend that you join it. The draft 
concludes that the Shared Time and Community Education programs 
are unconstitutional because they have the primary effect of 
advancing religion. As I recall from our discussions prior to 
oral argument, this was the ground you on which you preferred for 
both cases to rest, rather than on the entanglement prong of the 
Lemon v. Kurtzman test. 
Aguilar, on the other hand, is decided on entanglement 
grounds. I seem to recall that you found that ground to be weak 
under the facts of this case, where it seemed highly unlikely 
that excessive entanglement in fact would result. On the other 
hand, under this Court's precedent, including Meek v. Pittenger, 
Justice Brennan is entirely justified in relying on entanglement, 
because of the extensive monitoring that occurred in the New York 
programs to be sure teachers were not inculcating religious 
beliefs. In sum, you could join Aguilar, since it conforms 
precisely to precedent. Given your concerns expressed earlier, 
however, you might want to write a brief c nc rrence stating that 
----------~~~~~~--- ~ 
the Title I programs inevitably have the primary effect of 
advancing religion because they relieve the parochial schools of 
providing supplementary and remedial educational courses. 
Let me know if you want me to draft something. 
. ~ 
CHAMBERS OF' 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.iu.prtntt (Jfaurt ltf t4t ~nittb .italt# 
'JTMlfington.~. Of. 2llc?,.~ 
April 2, 1985 
Re: 83-990, School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball 
Dear Bill, 
I will be writing separately in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMI!!IERS 01" 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.ilupt"tmt Of&tttrt ltf tltt ~b .l'tatt• 
11hudtin.ghtu. ~. Of. 211.;t'l-~ 
April 2, 1985 
7 
Re: No. 83-990 - Grand Rapids School District 
v. Ball 
Dear Bill: 




cc: The Conference 
I • 
CHAMeERS 0,-
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.A'npuuu Q1&nttt gf tltt ~b .A'tatt• 
,.ultittllton, ~. <q. 20c?'l' 
April 2, 1985 
Re: 93-990 - Grand Rapids School District 
v. Ball 
Dear Bill: 




Copies to the Conference 
-.;,·· ~~. ~. 
/ 
CHAMBERS O F" 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.. u:pttmt <lfomt gf tlft ~tb •taft• 
Jlaglfinghtn. ~. <!f. 2llc?"~ 
April 8, 1985 
83-990 - Grand Rapids School District 
of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball 
Dear Bill, 
case. 
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83-990 Grand Rapids v. Ball 
84-237 ~quilar v. Felton 
Pleas~ join rn~ in tr.~s~ two case~. 
I am circulating a concurring opinion in Aguliar 




cc: The Conference 
' .. 
CHAMBERS 01" 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.hFtmt QIDlU't &tf tlft 'Jlnittb •hdt• 
:.ufrington. ~. QI. 2Dc?"~ 
May 13, 1985 
Re: No. 83-990, School District of City of Grand Rapids v. Ball 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
jlu:pt"tntt (!f£tnft of tlft ~b .t\tatu 
1Dasltinghtn. ~.Of. 211~~~ 
CHAMI!IERS 01'" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
May 15, 1985 
Re: No. 83-990-School District of Grand Rapids v. 
Ball 
Dear Bill: 
I would go along with the change proposed in 
the paragraph on pages 8-9. 
Justice Brennan 








.JUSTICE w .. . .J . 5RENNAN, .JR. 
'"' ... , 
May 15, 1985 
Dear Thurgood, Harry, Lewis and John: 
I would like to suggest a change in the 
paragraph at pages 8-9 of the draft opinion in 
School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball along the 
lines of the attached. Would you let me know if 








To replace paragraph at pp. 8-9 of Grand Rapids draft: 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s., at 612-613, we stated: 
Every analysis in this area must begin with 
consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by 
the Court over many years. Three such tests may be 
gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a 
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or 
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 
u.s. 236, 243 (1968); finally, the statute must not 
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.' Walz [v. Tax Commission, 397 u.s. 664, 674 
(1970)]." 
The Lemon test arose not from a single case, but instead 
reflected the lessons of the developing body of this Court's 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., School District 
of Abington Township v. Schempp, supra, at 222. Although various 
parties with divergent views of the mandates of the Establishment 
Clause have pointed to perceived failings in the Lemon test over 
the years, we have never adopted any other general test for 
detecting state action that transgresses the limits of the 
Establishment Clause. The Lemon test concentrates attention on 
the issues--purpose, effect, entanglement--that determine whether 
a particular state action is an improper "law respecting the 
Establishment of religion." We therefore reaffirm that state 
~
action alleged to violate the Establishment Clause1ftY~ be 
measured against .the Lemon criteria. 
' ' 
lgs May 16, 1985 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda 
Re: Justice Brennan's Lemon paragraph for Grand Rapids v. Ball 
I spoke to Lee about your concerns about Justice 
Brennan's statement at the end of his proposed paragraph that 
"[w]e therefore affirm that state action alleged to violate the 
Establishment Clause must be measured against the Lemon 
criteria." It is true that Marsh v. Chambers did not apply 
Lemon; however, your opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree cites Marsh as 
the only exception. Lee and I both feel that it would be 
contrary to your strong support of Lemon to suggest now that 
Lemon need not always be applied. Perhaps you could suggest to 
Justice Brennan that he change "must" in his last sentence to 
"should." Thus, the sentence would read: "We therefore affirm 
that state action alleged to violate the Establishment Clause 
should be measured against the Lemon criteria." This suggests no 
lessening of support for the Lemon test, while leaving Marsh to 
stand as the historical oddity that it is. 
,·. 
CHAMI!SERS or 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
Dear Thurgood, Harry, Lewis and John: 
May 16, 1985 
The change I suggested in the Grand Rapids op1n1on was 
satisfactory to Thurgood and Harry. John, however, has suggested 
that the last two sentences of the revision instead be added to 
the paragraph as it stands in the current draft. The two 
sentences read as follows: "The Lemon test concentrates 
attention on the issues--purpose, effect, entanglement--that 
determine whether a particular state action is an improper 'law 
respecting the Establishment of religion.' We therefore reaffirm 
that state action alleged to violate the Establishment Clause 









11,-a v 16 , J. 9 8 r:; 
81-990 School District of Grand ~apids v . Ball 
Dear Bill: 
I could aaree with either vour suggested new lan-
quag~ or with Jn~n's suagPstion, provide~ in eit~er C3Se 
that t~P. •,;0rr1 "should" he substit 1Jt~d for "must" in the 
final sentC'nce. 
1\s 'lW ~o.,curr.ir.o opinions in thn Pendinq cases 
maJ<e c1 e~r, T full" r,u';)nort Lemon. I sl:v <J\'lf'lV from uc:;ing 
t~e word "must," however, as it is stronger than necessarv . 
Bearinq M~rsh v. ~ham~ers in mind, it occurs to m~ t~at none 
of us c~n f'0rosee ~··'f1etl1er in some ftJtnr"? case application of 
the Lemon test alone would not he dispositive . 
I thi~k t~e c~anges - either vou~~ or John's - are 
constructive. 
,Just ice Brennan 
lfpjsc; 
cc: Justice Marshall 
.. T11st ice B1ackmun 





..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.hFtm:t '!iouri of tlft Jlnittb J)hdte 
.ulfington. ~. "i· 20.;;,., 
May 16, 1985 
Re: No. 83-990, Grand Rapids School District v. Ball 
Dear Bill: 
I am still with you, and whatever you and John work out 
is all right with me. 
Justice Brennan 
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/ o1L From: Justice Brennan 
Circulated: ________ _ 
MAY 2 0 1985 
Recirculated: _______ _ 
2nd DRAFT 
. . 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-990 
GRAND RAPIDS SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY 
OF GRAND RAPIDS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
PHYLLIS BALL ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[May-, 1985] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The School District of Grand Rapids, Michigan, adopted 
. two programs in which classes for nonpublic school students 
are financed by the public school system, taught by teachers 
hired by the public school system, and conducted in "leased" 
classrooms in the nonpublic schools. Most of the nonpublic 
schools involved in the programs are sectarian religious 
schools. This case raises the question whether these pro-
grams impermissibly involve the government in the support 
of sectarian religious activities and thus violate the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment. 
I 
A 
At issue in this case are the Community Education and 
Shared Time programs offered in the nonpublic schools of 
Grand Rapids, Michigan. These programs, first instituted 
in the 1976-1977 school year, provide classes to nonpublic 
school students at public expense in classrooms located in and 
leased from the local nonpublic schools. 
The Shared Time program offers classes during the regular 
school day that are intended to be supplementary to the "core 
curriculum" courses that the State of Michigan requires as a 
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part of an accredited school program. Among the subjects 
offered are "remedial" and "enrichment" mathematics, "re-
medial" and "enrichment" reading, art, music, and physical 
education. A typical nonpublic school student attends these 
classes for one or two class periods per week; approximately 
"ten percent of any given nonpublic school student's time 
'during the academic year would consist of Shared Time in-
struction." Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State v. School Dist. of Grand Rapids, 46 F. Supp. 1071, . 
1079 (WD Mich. 1982). Although Shared Time itself is a pro-
gram offered only in the nonpublic schools, there was testi-
mony that the courses included in that program are offered, 
albeit perhaps in a somewhat different form, in the public 
schools as well. All of the classes that are the subject of this 
case are taught in elementary schools, with the exception of 
Math Topics, a remedial math course taught in the secondary 
schools. 1 • 
The Shared Time teachers are full-time employees of the 
public schools, who often move from classroom to classroom 
during the course of the school day. A "significant portion" 
of the teachers (approximately 10%) "previously taught in 
nonpublic schools, and many of those had been assigned to 
the same nonpublic school where they were previously em-
ployed." I d., at 1078. The School District of Grand Rapids 
hires Shared Time teachers in accordance with its ordinary 
1 Shared Time and Community Education courses are taught at the ele-
mentary and secondary level in nonpublic schools. However, after the 
District Court found for respondents and enjoined the further operation of 
the programs, petitioners did not appeal the decision to the extent that it 
involved "physical education and industrial arts shared time classes at the 
secondary level and community education classes at the secondary level." 
App. 39. Thus, the appeal involved only Shared Time classes at the ele-
mentary level, Community Education classes at the elementary level, and 
the remedial math Shared Time class at the secondary level. Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State v. School Dist. of Grand Rap-
ids , 718 F. 2d, at 1389, 1390 (1983). These are the only programs whose 
constitutionality is now before the Court. 
• 
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hiring procedures. Ibid. The public school system appar-
ently provides all of the supplies, materials, and equipment 
used in connection with Shared Time instruction. See App. 
341. 
The Community Education Program is offered throughout 
·the Grand Rapids community in schools and on other sites, 
for children as well as adults. The classes at issue here are 
taught in the nonpublic elementary schools and commence at . 
the conclusion of the regular school day. Among the courses 
offered are Arts and Crafts, Home Economics, Spanish, 
Gymnastics, Yearbook Production, Christmas Arts and 
Crafts, Drama, Newspaper, Humanities, Chess, Model 
Building, and Nature Appreciation. The District Court 
found that "[a]lthough certain Community Education courses 
· offered at nonpublic school sites are not offered at the public 
schools on a Community Education basis, all Community 
Education programs are otherwise available at the public 
schools, usually as a part of their more extensive regular 
curriculum." 546 F. Supp., at 1079. 
Community Education teachers are part-time public school 
employees. Community Education courses are completely 
voluntary and are offered only if 12 or more students enroll. 
Because a well-known teacher is necessary to attract the req-
uisite number of students, the School District accords a pref-
erence in hiring to instructors already teaching within the 
school. Thus, "virtually every Community Education course 
conducted on facilities leased from nonpublic schools has an 
instructor otherwise employed full time by the same nonpub-
lic school." Ibid. 
Both programs are administered similarly. The Director 
of the program, a public school employee, sends packets of 
course listings to the participating nonpublic schools before 
the school year begins. The nonpublic school administrators 
then decide which courses they want to offer. The Director 
works out an academic schedule for each school, taking into 
0 
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account, inter alia, the varying religious holidays celebrated 
by the schools of different denominations. 
N onpublic school administrators decide which classrooms 
will be used for the programs, and the Director then inspects 
the facilities and consults with Shared Time teachers to make 
.sure the facilities are satisfactory. The public schoo~ system 
pays the nonpublic schools for the use of the necessary class-
room space by entering into "leases" at the rate of $6 per 
classroom per week. The "leases," however, contain no · 
mention of the particular room, space, or facility leased and 
teachers' rooms, libraries, lavatories, and similar facilities 
are made available at no additional charge. Id., at 1077. 
Each room used in the programs has to be free of any cruci-
fix, religious symbol, or artifact, although such religious sym-
bols can be present in the adjoining hallways, corridors, and 
other facilities used in connection with the program. During 
the time that a given classroom is being used in the pro-
grams, the teacher is required to post a sigil stating that it is 
a "public school classroom." 2 However, there are no signs 
posted outside the school buildings indicating that public 
school courses are conducted inside or that the facilities are 
being used as a public school annex. 
Although petitioners label the Shared Time and Commu-
nity Education students as "part-time public school stu-
dents," the students attending Shared Time and Community 
Education courses in facilities leased from a nonpublic school 
are the same students who attend that particular school oth-
erwise. Id., at 1078. There is no evidence that any public 
school student has ever attended a Shared Time or Commu-
nity Education class in a nonpublic school. Id., at 1097. 
2 The signs read as follows: "GRAND RAPIDS PUBLIC SCHOOLS' 
ROOM. THIS ROOM HAS BEEN LEASED BY THE GRAND RAP-
IDS PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, FOR THE PURPOSE OF CON-
DUCTING PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS. THE 
ACTIVITY IN THIS ROOM IS CONTROLLED SOLELY BY THE 
GRAND RAPIDS PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT." App. 200. 
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The District Court found that "[t]hough Defendants claim the 
Shared Time program is available to all students, the record 
is abundantly clear that only nonpublic school students wear-
ing the cloak of a 'public school student' can enroll in it." 
Ibid. The District Court noted that "[ w ]hereas public school 
·students are assembled at the public facility nearest , to their 
residence, students in religious schools are assembled on the 
basis of religion without any consideration of residence or . 
school district boundaries." Id., at 1093. Thus, "beneficia-
ries are wholly designated on the basis of religion," ibid., and 
these "public school" classes, in contrast to ordinary public 
school classes which are largely neighborhood-based, are as 
segregated by religion as are the schools at which they are 
offered.3 
Forty of the forty-one schools at which the programs oper-
ate are sectarian in character. 4 The schools of course vary 
from one another, but substantial evidence suggests that 
they share deep religious purposes. For instance, the Par-
ent Handbook of one Catholic school states the goals of Cath-
olic education as "[a] God oriented environment which perme-
ates the total educational program," "[a] Christian atmos-
phere which guides and encourages participation in the 
church's commitment to social justice," and "[a] continuous 
development of knowledge of the Catholic faith, its tradi-
tions, teachings and theology." I d., at 1080. A policy state-
ment of the Christian schools similarly proclaims that "it is 
not sufficient that the teachings of Christianity be a separate 
subject in the curriculum, but the Word of God must be an 
all-pervading force in the educational program." I d., at 
3 As would be expected, a large majority of the students attending reli-
gious schools belong to the denomination that controls the school. The 
District Court found, for instance, that approximately 85 percent of the 
students at the Catholic schools are Catholic. 546 F. Supp., at 1080. 
• Twenty-eight of the schools are Roman Catholic, seven are Christian 




6 GRAND RAPIDS SCHOOL DISTRICT v. BALL 
1081. These Christian schools require all parents seeking to 
enroll their children either to subscribe to a particular doc-
trinal statement or to agree to have their children taught ac-
cording to the doctrinal statement. The District Court 
found that the schools are "pervasively sectarian," id., at 
.1096, n. 13, and .concluded "without hesitation that the pur-
poses of these schools is to advance their particular reli-
gions," id., at 1096, and that "a substantial portion of their 
functions are subsumed in the religious mission." I d., at · 
1084. 
B 
Respondents are six taxpayers who filed suit against the 
School District of Grand Rapids and a number of state offi-
cials. They charged that the Shared Time and Community 
Education programs violated the Establishment Clause of 
tne First Amendment of the Constitution, made applicable to 
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Everson v. 
Board of Education, 330 ·u. S. 1 (1947). After an 8-day 
bench trial, the District Court entered a judgment on the 
merits on behalf of respondents and enjoined further opera-
tion of the programs. • 
Applying the familiar three-part purpose, effect, and en-
tanglement test set out in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 
~ Petitioners alleged that respondents lacked taxpayer standing under 
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968), and Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U. S. 464 
(1982). The District Court and the Court of Appeals rejected the standing 
challenge. We affirm this finding, relying on the numerous cases in which 
we have adjudicated Establishment Clause challenges by state taxpayers 
to programs for aiding nonpublic schools. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 
433 U. S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U. S. 
736, 744 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 356-357, n. 6 (1975); 
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825 (1973); Committee for Public Education v. 
Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 762 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 735 
(1973); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U. S. 472, 478 
(1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 608, 611 (1971); Everson v. 
Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 3 (1947). 
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(1971), the court held that, although the purpose of the pro-
grams was secular, their effect was "distinctly impermissi-
ble." 546 F. Supp., at 1093. The court relied in particular 
on the fact that the programs at issue involved publicly pro-
vided instructional services that served nonpublic school stu-
dents segregated largely by religion on nonpublic school 
premises. The court also noted that the programs conferred 
"direct benefits, both financial and otherwise, to the sectar-
ian institutions." /d., at 1094. Finally, the court found that 
the programs necessarily entailed an unacceptable level of · 
entanglement, both political and administrative, between the 
public school systems and the sectarian schools. Petitioners 
appealed the judgment of the District Court to the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. A divided panel of the Court 
of Appeals affirmed. Americans United for Separation of 
Church and State v. School Dist. of Grand Rapids, 718 F. 2d 
1389 (1983). We granted certiorari, 465 U. S. -- (1984), 
and now affirm. 
II 
A 
The First Amendment's guarantee that "Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion," as our 
cases demonstrate, is more than a pledge that no single reli-
gion will be designated as a state religion. Committee for 
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 771 (1973); 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 602, 612 (1971); McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961). It is also more than a 
mere injunction that governmental programs discriminating 
among religions are unconstitutional. See, e. g., Abington 
School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 216-217 (1963); 
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 211 (1948). 
The Establishment Clause instead primarily proscribes 
"sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of 
the sovereign in religious activity." Nyquist, supra, at 772; 
see also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664, 668 (1970). As 
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Education, supra, at 15-16, stated: "Neither [a State nor the 
Federal Government] can pass laws which aid one religion, 
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. . . . No 
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support 
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be 
called, or whatev.er form they may adopt to teach or practice 
religion." 
Since Everson made clear that the guarantees of the 
Establishment Clause apply to the States, we have often · 
grappled with the problem of state aid to nonpublic, religious 
schools. In all of these cases, our goal has been to give 
meaning to the sparse language and broad purposes of the 
Clause, while not unduly infringing on the ability of the 
States to provide for the welfare of their people in accordance 
with their own particular circumstances. Providing for the 
education of schoolchildren is surely a praiseworthy purpose. 
But our cases have consistently recognized that even such a 
·praiseworthy, secular purpose cannot validate government 
aid to parochial schools when the aid has the effect of promot-
ing a single religion or religion generally or when the aid un-
duly entangles the government in matters religious. For 
just as religion throughout history has provided spiritual 
comfort, guidance, and inspiration to many, it can also serve 
powerfully to divide societies and to exclude those whose be-
liefs are not in accord with particular religions or sects that 
have from time to time achieved dominance. The solution to 
this problem adopted by the Framers and consistently recog-
nized by this Court is jealously to guard the right of every 
individual to worship according to the dictates of conscience 
while requiring the government to maintain a course of neu-
trality among religions, and between religion and non-
religion. Only in this way can we "make room for as wide a 
variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man 
deem necessary" and "sponsor an attitude on the part of gov-
ernment that shows no partiality to any one group and lets 
each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the ap-
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peal of its dogma." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 313 
(1952). 
We have noted that the three-part test first articulated in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, at 612-613, guides "[t]he general na-
ture of our inquiry in this area," Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 
388, 394 (1983): 
"Every analysis in this area must begin with consider-
ation of the cumulative criteria developed by the· Court 
over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned 
from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular 
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary 
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 
243 (1968); finally, the statute must not foster 'an exces-
sive government entanglement with religion.' W alz [ v. 
Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970)]." Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, at 612-613. 
These tests "must not be viewed as setting the precise limits 
to the necessary constitutional inquiry, but serve only as 
guidelines with which to identify instances in which the 
objectives of the Establishment Clause have been impaired." 
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 359 (1975). We have par-
ticularly relied on Lemon in every case involving the sensi-
tive relationship between government and religion in the 
education of our children. The government's activities in 
this area can have a magnified impact on impressionable 
young minds, and the occasional rivalry of parallel public and 
private school systems offers an all-too-ready opportunity for 
divisive rifts along religious lines in the body politic. See 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 796-
798; Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 622-624. The Lemon 
test concentrates attention on the issues-purposes, effect, 
entanglement-that determine whether a particular state ac-
tion is an improper "law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion." We therefore reaffirm that state action alleged to vi-
• 
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olate the Establishment Clause should be measured against 
the Lemon criteria. 
As has often been true in school aid cases, there is no dis-
pute as to the first test. Both the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals found that the purpose of the Community 
.Education and Shared Time programs was "manifestly secu-
lar." 546 F. Supp., at 1085; see also 718 F. 2d, at 1398. We 
find no reason to disagree with this holding, and therefore go 
on to consider whether the primary or principal effect of the · 
challenged programs is to advance or inhibit religion. 
B 
Our inquiry must begin with a consideration of the nature 
of the institutions in which the programs operate. Of the 41 
private schools where these "part-time public schools" have 
operated, 40 are identifiably religious schools. It is true that 
each school may not share all of the characteristics of reli-
gious schools as articulated, for example, in the complaint in 
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 356 (1975); see also Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 615. The District Court found, how-
ever, that "[b]ased upon the massive testimony and exhibits, 
the conclusion is inescapable that the religious institutions re-
ceiving instructional services from the public schools are sec-
tarian in the sense that a substantial portion of their func-
tions are subsumed in the religious mission." 546 F. Supp., 
at 1084; see Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 735 (1973); Meek 
v. Pittenger, supra, at 366 ("[t]he very purpose of many of 
those schools is to provide an integrated secular and religious 
education); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S., at 671 ("to 
assure future adherents to a particular faith" is "an affirma-
tive if not dominant policy of church schools"). At the reli-
gious schools here-as at the sectarian schools that have been 
the subject of our past cases-"the secular education those 
schools provide goes hand in hand with the religious mission 
that is the only reason for the schools' existence. Within 
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that institution, the two are inextricably intertwined." 6 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S., at 657 (opinion of BRENNAN, 
J.). See also Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 365-366; Board of 
Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 245, 247-248 (1968). 
Given that 40 of the 41 schools in this case are thus "perva-
sively sectarian," the challenged public-school programs op-
erating in the religious schools may impermissibly advance 
religion in three different ways. First, the teachers partici-
P?ting in the programs may become involved in intentionally 
or inadvertently inculcating particular religious tenets ' or be-
liefs. Second, the programs may provide a crucial symbolic 
link between government and religion, thereby enlisting-at 
least in the eyes of impressionable youngsters-the powers of 
government to the support of the religious denomination op-
erating the school. Third, the programs may have the effect 
of directly promoting religion by impermissibly providing a 
subsidy to the primary religious mission of the institutions 
affected. 
(1) 
Although Establishment Clause jurisprudence is charac-
terized by few absolutes, the Clause does absolutely prohibit 
government-financed or government-sponsored indoctrina-
tion into the beliefs of a particular religious faith. See Stone 
v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam); Meek v. 
Pittenger, supra, at 370; Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 619 
("The State must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that 
6 The elementary and secondary schools in this case differ substantially 
from the colleges that we refused to characterize as "pervasively sectarian" 
in Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U. S., at 755-759 (1976). 
See also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 
U. S. 672 (1971). Many of the schools in this case include prayer and at-
tendance at religious services as a part of their curriculum, are run by 
churches or other organizations whose members must subscribe to particu-
lar religious tenets, have faculties and student bodies composed largely of 
adherents of the particular denomination, and give preference in attend-
ance to children belonging to the denomination. 546 F. Supp., at 
1080-1084. 
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subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion"); Levitt v. Com-
mittee for Public Education, 413 U. S. 472, 480 (1973) 
("[T]he State is constitutionally compelled to assure that the 
state-supported activity is not being used for religious indoc-
trination"); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 429 (1962); Zorach 
.v. Clauson, 343 U. S., at 314 ("Government may not finance 
·religious groups rtor undertake religious instruction nor blend 
secular and sectarian education ... "). Such indoctrination, 
if permitted to occur, would have devastating effects on the . 
right of each individual voluntarily to determine what to be-
lieve (and what not to believe) free of any coercive pressures 
from the State, while at the same time tainting the resulting 
religious beliefs with a corrosive secularism. 
In Meek v. Pittenger, supra, the Court invalidated a stat-
ute providing for the loan of state-paid professional staff-
including teachers-to nonpublic schools to provide remedial 
and accelerated instruction, guidance counseling and testing, 
arid other services on the premises of the nonpublic schools. 
Such a program, if not subjected to a "comprehensive, 
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance," Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 619 (quoted in Meek, supra, at 370), 
would entail an unacceptable risk that the the state-spon-
sored instructional personnel would "advance the religious 
mission of the church-related schools in which they serve." 
Meek, 421 U. S., at 370. Even though the teachers were 
paid by the State, "[t]he potential for impermissible fostering 
of religion under these circumstances, although somewhat re-
duced, is nonetheless present." ld., at 372. The program 
in Meek, if not sufficiently monitored, would simply have en-
tailed too great a risk of state-sponsored indoctrination. 
The programs before us today share the defect that we 
identified in Meek. With respect to the Community Educa-
tion Program, the District Court found that "virtually every 
Community Education course conducted on facilities leased 
from nonpublic schools has an instructor otherwise employed 
full time by the same nonpublic school." 546 F. Supp., at 
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1079. These instructors, many of whom no doubt teach in 
the religious schools precisely because they are adherents of 
the controlling denomination and want to serve their reli-
gious community zealously, are expected during the regular 
school day to inculcate their students with the tenets and be-
iiefs of their particular religious faiths. Yet the premise of 
the program is that those instructors can put aside their reli-
gious convictions and engage in entirely secular Community . 
Education instruction as soon as the school day is over. 
Moreover, they are expected to do so before the same reli-
gious-school students and in the same religious-school class-
rooms that they employed to advance religious purposes dur-
ing the "official" school day. Nonetheless, as petitioners 
themselves asserted, Community Education classes are not 
specifically monitored for religious content. App. 353. 
We do not question that the dedicated and professional re-
ligious school teachers employed by the Community Educa-
tion program will attempt in good faith to perform their secu-
lar mission conscientiously. Cf. Lemon, 403 U. S., at 
618-619. Nonetheless, there is a substantial risk that, 
overtly or subtly, the religious message they are expected to 
convey during the regular school day will infuse the suppos-
edly secular classes they teach after school. The danger 
arises "not because the public employee [is] likely deliber-
ately to subvert his task to the service of religion, but rather 
because the pressures of the environment might alter his be-
havior from its normal course." Wolman v. Walter, 433 
U. S. 229, 247 (1977). "The conflict of functions inheres in 
the situation." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 617. 
The Shared Time program, though structured somewhat 
differently, nonetheless also poses a substantial risk of state-
sponsored indoctrination. The most important difference 
between the programs is that most of the instructors in the 
Shared Time program are full-time teachers hired by the 
public schools. Moreover, although "virtually every" Com-
munity Education instructor is a full-time religious school 
' 
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teacher, 546 F. Supp., at 1079, only "[a] significant portion" 
of the Shared Time instructors previously worked in the 
religious schools. 7 Id., at 1078. Nonetheless, as with the 
Community Education program, no attempt is made to 
monitor the Shared Time courses for religious content. 
App. 330.8 
Thus, despite these differences between the two programs, 
our holding in Meek controls the inquiry with respect to 
Shared Time, as well as Community Education. Shared 
Time instructors are teaching academic subjects in religious 
schools in courses virtually indistinguishable from the other 
courses offered during the regular religious-school day. The 
teachers in this program, even more than their Community 
Education colleagues, are "performing important educational 
services in schools in which education is an integral part of 
the dominant sectarian mission and in which an atmosphere 
dedicated to the advancement of religious belief is constantly 
maintained." Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S., at 371. Teach-
ers in such an atmosphere may well subtly (or overtly) con-
form their instruction to the environment in which they 
teach, while students will perceive the instruction provided 
in the context of the dominantly religious message of the in-
stitution, thus reinforcing the indoctrinating effect. As we 
stated in Meek, "[w]hether the subject is 'remedial reading,' 
'advanced reading,' or simply 'reading,' a teacher remains a 
teacher, and the danger that religious doctrine will become 
intertwined with secular instruction persists." I d., at 370. 
Unlike types of aid that the Court has upheld, such as state-
created standardized tests, Committee for Public Education 
7 Approximately 10 percent of the Shared Time instructors were previ-
ously employed by the religious schools, and many of these were reas-
signed back to the school at which they had previously taught. 
8 The public school system does include Shared Time teachers in its ordi-
nary teacher evaluation program, which subjects them to evaluation once 
each year during their first year of teaching and once every three years 
after that. App. 54, 330. 
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v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646 (1980), or diagnostic services, 
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S., at 241-244, there is a "sub-
stantial risk" that programs operating in this environment 
would "be used for religious educational purposes." Com-
mittee for Public Education v. Regan, supra, at 656 . 
• The Court of Appeals of course recognized that respond-
ents adduced no evidence of specific incidents of religious 
indoctrination in this case. 718 F. 2d, at 1404. But the 
absence of proof of specific incidents is not dispositive. 
When conducting a supposedly secular class in the perva-
sively sectarian environment of a religious school, a teacher 
may knowingly or unwillingly tailor the content of the course 
to fit the school's announced goals. If so, there is no reason 
to believe that this kind of ideological influence would be de-
tected or reported by students, by their parents, or by the 
school system itself. The students are presumably attend-
ing religious schools precisely in order to receive religious in-
struction. Mter spending the balance of their school day in 
classes heavily influenced by a religious perspective, they 
would have little motivation or ability to discern improper 
ideological content that may creep into a Shared Time or 
Community Education course. Neither their parents nor 
the parochial schools would have cause to complain if the ef-
fect of the publicly-supported instruction were to advance the 
schools' sectarian mission. And the public school system it-
self has no incentive to detect or report any specific incidents 
of improper state-sponsored indoctrination. Thus, the lack 
of evidence of specific incidents of indoctrination is of little 
significance. 
(2) 
Our cases have recognized that the Establishment Clause 
guards against more than direct, state-funded efforts to in-
doctrinate youngsters in specific religious beliefs. Govern-
ment promotes religion as effectively when it fosters a close 
identification of its powers and responsibilities with those of 
any-or all-religious denominations as when it attempts to 
• 
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inculcate specific religious doctrines. If this identification 
conveys a message of government endorsement or disap-
proval of religion, a core purpose of the Establishment 
Clause is violated. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. --, 
-- (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); cf. Abington School 
District v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 222 (history teaches that 
"powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion of gov-
ernmental and religious functions or a concert or dependency 
of one upon the other to the end that official support of the 
State or Federal Government would be placed behind the te-
nets of one or of all orthodoxies"). As we stated in Larkin v. 
Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116, 125-126 (1984): "[T]he 
mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by 
Church and State provides a significant symbolic benefit to 
religion in the minds of some by reason of the power con-
ferred." See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274 
(1981) (finding effect "incidental" and not "primary'' because 
it "does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on reli-
gious sects or practices"). 
It follows that an important concern of the effects test is 
whether the symbolic union· of church and state effected by 
the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be 
perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as 
an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, 
of their individual religious choices. The inquiry into this 
kind of effect must be conducted with particular care when 
many of the citizens perceiving the governmental message 
are children in their formative years. 9 Cf. Widmar v. Vin-
cent, supra, at 274; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 
9 For instance, this Court has held that prayers conducted at the com-
mencement of a legislative session do not violate the Establishment 
Clause, in part because of long historical usage and lack of particular sec-
tarian content. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 795 (1983). But we 
have never indulged a similar assumption with respect to prayers con-
ducted at the opening of the school day. Abington School District v. 
Schempp, 374 U. S. 103 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962). 
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685-686 (1971). The symbolism of a union between church 
and state is most likely to influence children of tender years, 
whose experience is limited and whose beliefs consequently 
are the function of environment as much as of free and volun-
tary choice. 
· Our school-aid cases have recognized a sensitivity , to the 
symbolic impact of the union of church and state. Grappling 
with problems in many ways parallel to those we face today, 
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948), held 
that a public school may not permit part-time religious in-
struction on its premises as a part of the school program, 
even if participation in that instruction is entirely voluntary 
and even if the instruction itself is conducted only by nonpub-
lic-school personnel. Yet in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 
306 (1952), the Court held that a similar program conducted 
off the premises of the public school passed constitutional 
muster. The difference in symbolic impact helps to explain 
the difference between the cases. The symbolic connection 
of church and state in the McCollum program presented the 
students with a graphic symbol of the "concert or union or 
dependency'' of church and state, see Zorach, supra, at 312. 
This very symbolic union was conspicuously absent in the 
Z orach program. 10 
In the programs challenged in this case, the religious 
school students spend their typical school day moving be-
tween religious-school and "public-school" classes. Both 
types of classes take place in the same religious-school build-
ing and both are largely composed of students who are adher-
ents of the same denomination. In this environment, the 
students would be unlikely to discern the crucial difference 
between the religious-school classes and the "public-school" 
1° Compare Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S., at 367-373 (invalidating pro-
gram providing for state-funded remedial services on religious-school 
premises) with Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S., at 244-248 (upholding pro-
gram providing for similar services at neutral sites off the premises of the 
religious school). 
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classes, even if the latter were successfully kept free of reli-
gious indoctrination. As one commentator has written: 
"This pervasive [religious] atmosphere makes on the 
young student's mind a lasting imprint that the holy and 
transcendental should be central to all facets of life. It 
increases respect for the church as an institution to guide 
one's total life' adjustments and undoubtedly helps ·stimu-
late interest in religious vocations. . . . In short, the 
parochial school's total operation serves to fulfill both 
secular and religious functions concurrently, and the two 
cannot be completely separated. Support of any part of 
its activity entails some support of the disqualifying reli-
gious function of molding the religious personality of the 
young student." Giannella, Religious Liberty, Non-
establishment and Doctrinal Development: Part II. 
The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 513, 
574 (1968). 
Consequently, even the student who notices the "public 
school" sign 11 temporarily posted would have before him a 
powerful symbol of state endorsement and encouragement of 
the religious beliefs taught in the same class at some other 
time during the day. 
As Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit in the 
companion case to the case at bar, stated: 
Under the City's plan public school teachers are, so far 
as appearance is concerned, a regular adjunct of the reli-
gious school. They pace the same halls, use classrooms 
in the same building, teach the same students, and con-
fer with the teachers hired by the religious schools, 
many of them members of religious orders. The reli-
gious school appears to the public as a joint enterprise 
staffed with some teachers paid by its religious sponsor 
and others by the public. Felton v. Secretary, United 
States Dept. of Ed., 739 F. 2d 48, at 67-68. 
11 See n. 2, supra. 
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This effect-the symbolic union of government and religion in 
one sectarian enterprise-is ail impermissible effect under 
the Establishment Clause. 
(3) 
In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947), the 
Court stated that "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can 
be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, 
whatever thay may be called, or whatever form they may 
adopt to teach or practice religion." I d., at 16. With but 
one exception, our subsequent cases have struck down at-
tempts by States to make payments out of public tax dollars 
directly to primary or secondary religious educational institu-
tions. See, e. g., Committee for Public Education v. 
Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 774-781 (reimbursement for mainte-
nance and repair expenses); Levitt v. Committee for Public 
Education, 413 U. S. 472 (1973) (reimbursement for teacher-
prepared tests); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971) 
(salary supplements for nonpublic school teachers). But see 
Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646 
(1980) (permitting public subsidy for certain routinized 
recordkeeping and testing services performed by nonpublic 
schools but required by state law). 
Aside from cash payments, the Court has distinguished be-
tween two categories of programs in which public funds are 
used to finance secular activities that religious schools would 
otherwise fund from their own resources. In the first cate-
gory, the Court has noted that it is "well established . . . that 
not every law that confers an 'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'inci-
dental' benefit upon religious institutions is, for that reason 
alone, constitutionally invalid." Committee for Public Edu-
cation v. Nyquist, supra, at 771; Roemer v. Maryland Pub-
lic Works Board, 426 U. S. 736, 747 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 
413 U. S., at 742-743. In such "indirect" aid cases, the gov-
ernment has used primarily secular means to accomplish a 
primarily secular end, and no "primary effect" of advancing 
,., -·~ . 
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religion has th~s been found. On this rationale, the Court 
has upheld programs providing for loans of secular textbooks 
to nonpublic school students, Board of Education v. Allen, 
392 U. S. 236 (1968); see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S., 
at 236-238; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S., at 359-362, and 
programs providing bus transportation for nonpublic ,school 
children, Everson v. Board of Education, supra. 
In the second category of cases, the Court has relied on the 
Establishment Clause prohibition of forms of aid that provide 
"direct and substantial advancement of the sectarian enter-
prise." Wolman v. Walter, supra, at 250. In such "direct 
aid" cases, the government, although acting for a secular pur-
pose, has done so by directly supporting a religious institu-
tion. Under this rationale, the Court has struck down state 
schemes providing for tuition grants and tax benefits for par-
ents whose children attend religious school, see Sloan v. 
Lemon, 413 U. S. 825 (1973); Committee for Public Educa-
tion v. Nyquist, supra, at 780-794, and programs providing 
for "loan" of instructional materials to be used in religious 
schools, see Wolman v. Walter, supra, at 248-251; Meek v. 
Pittenger, supra, at 365. In Sloan and Nyquist, the aid was 
formally given to parents and not directly to the religious 
schools, while in Wolman and Meek, the aid was in-kind as-
sistance rather than the direct contribution of public funds. 
Nonetheless, these differences in form were insufficient to 
save programs whose effect was indistinguishable from that 
of a direct subsidy to the religious school. 
Thus, the Court has never accepted the mere possibility of 
subsidization, as the above cases demonstrate, as sufficient to 
invalidate an aid program. On the other hand, this effect is 
not wholly unimportant for Establishment Clause purposes. 
If it were, the public schools could gradually take on them-
selves the entire responsibility for teaching secular subjects 
on religious school premises. The question in each case must 
be whether the effect of the proffered aid is "direct and sub-
stantial," Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
83-990--0PINION 
GRAND RAPIDS SCHOOL DISTRICT v. BALL 21 
supra, at 784-785, n. 39, or indirect and incidental. 12 "The 
problem, like many problems in constitutional law, is one of 
degree." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S., at 314. 
We have noted in the past that the religious school has dual 
functions, providing its students with a secular education 
while it promotes a particular religious perspective. See 
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S., at 401-402; Board of Education 
v. Allen, supra. . In Meek and Wolman, we held unconstitu-
tional state programs providing for loans of instrU.ctional 
equipment and materials to religious schools, on the ground 
that the programs advanced the "primary, religion-oriented · 
educational function of the sectarian school." Meek, supra, 
at 364; Wolman, supra, at 248-251. Cf. Wolman, supra, at 
243 (upholding provision of diagnostic services, which were 
"'general welfare services for children that may be provided 
by the State regardless of the incidental benefit that accrues 
to church-related schools,"' quoting Meek, supra, at 371, 
n. 21). The programs challenged here, which provide teach-
ers in addition to the instructional equipment and materials, 
have a simil~r-and forbidden-effect of advancing religion. 
This kind of direct aid to the educational function of the reli-
gious school is indistinguishable from the provision of a direct 
cash subsidy to the religious school that is most clearly pro-
hibited under the Establishment Clause. 
Petitioners claim that the aid here, like the textbooks in 
Allen, flows primarily to the students, not to the religious 
schools. 13 Of course, all aid to religious schools ultimately 
12 This "indirect subsidy" effect only evokes Establishment Clause con-
cerns when the public funds flow to "an institution in which religion is so 
pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the 
religious mission .. . "Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S., at 743. In this case, 
the District Court explicitly found that forty of the forty-one participating 
nonpublic schools were pervasively religious in this sense. 546 F. Supp., 
at 1080. For this reason, the inquiry into whether the aid is "direct and 
substantial" is necessary. 
'
8 Petitioners also cite Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983), which up-
held a general tax deduction available to parents of all school children for 
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"flows to" the students, and petitioners' argument if accepted 
would validate all forms of nonideological aid to religious 
schools, including those explicitly rejected in our prior cases. 
Yet in Meek, we held unconstitutional the loan of instruc-
tional materials to religious schools and in Wolman, we re-
jected the fiction that a similar program could be saved by 
masking it as aid to individual students. Wolman, 433 
U. S., at 249, n. 16. It follows afortiori that the aid here, 
which includes not only instructional materials but also the 
provision of instructional services by teachers in the 
parochial school building, "inescapably [has] the primary ef- · 
feet of providing a direct and substantial advancement of the 
sectarian enterprise." !d., at 250. Where, as here, no 
meaningful distinction can be made between aid to the stu-
dent and aid to the school, "the concept of a loan to individ-
uals is a transparent fiction." Wolman v. Walter, id., at 264 
(opinion of POWELL, J.). 
Petitioners .also argue that this "subsidy" effect is not sig-
nificant in this case, because the Community Education and 
Shared Time programs supplemented the curriculum with 
courses not previously offered in the religious schools and not 
required by school rule or state regulation. Of course, this 
fails to distinguish the programs here from those found un-
constitutional in Meek. See 421 U. S., at 368. As in Meek, 
we do not find that this feature of the program is controlling. 
First, there is no way of knowing whether the religious 
schools would have offered some or all of these courses if the 
public school system had not offered them first. The distinc-
tion between courses that "supplement" and those that "sup-
plant" the regular curriculum is therefore not nearly as clear 
as petitioners allege. Second, although the precise courses 
offered in these programs may have been new to the partici-
school expenses, including tuition to religious schools. Mueller, however, 
is quite unlike the instant case. Unlike Mueller, the aid provided here is 
unmediated by the tax code and the "numerous, private choices of individ-
ual parents of school-age children." !d., at 399. 
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pating religious schools, their general subject matter-read-
ing, math, etc.-was surely a part of the curriculum in the 
past, and the concerns of the Establishment Clause may thus 
be triggered despite the "supplemental" nature of the 
courses. Cf. Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 370-371. Third, 
and most important, petitioners' argument would permit the 
public schools gradually to take over the entire secular 
curriculum of the religious school, for the latter could surely 
discontinue existing courses so that they might be replaced a 
year or two later by a Community Education or Shared Time 
course with the same content. The average religious school 
student, for instance, now spends 10 percent of the school 
day in Shared Time classes. But there is no principled basis 
on which this Court can impose a limit on the percentage of 
the religious-school day that can be subsidized by the public 
school. To let the genie out of the bottle in this case would 
be to permit ever larger segments of the religious school 
curriculum to be turned over to the public school system, 
thus violating the cardinal principle that the State may not in 
effect become the prime supporter of the religious school sys-
tem. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 624-625. 
III 
We conclude that the challenged programs have the effect 
of promoting religion in three ways. 14 The state-paid in-
structors, influenced by the pervasively sectarian nature of 
the religious schools in which they work, may subtly or 
overtly indoctrinate the students in particular religious 
tenets at public expense. The symbolic union of church and 
state inherent in the provision of secular, state-provided in-
struction in the religious school buildings threatens to convey 
a message of state support for religion to students and to the 
14 Because of this conclusion, we need not determine whether aspects of 
the challenged programs impermissibly entangle the government in reli-
gious matters, in violation of the third prong of the Lemon test. But see 
Aguilar v. Felton, - U. S. - (1985). 
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general public. Finally, the programs in effect subsidize the 
religious functions of the parochial schools by taking over a 
substantial portion of their responsibility for teaching secular 
subjects. For these reasons, the conclusion is inescapable 
that the Community Education and Shared Time programs 
have the "primary or principal" effect of advancing religion, 
and therefore violate the dictates of the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment. 
N onpublic schools have played an important role' in the 
development of American education, and we have long recog-
nized that parents and their children have the right to choose · 
between public schools and available sectarian alternatives. 
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted in Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 
at 625, "nothing we have said can be construed to disparage 
the role of church-related elementary and secondary schools 
in our national life. Their contribution has been and is enor-
mous." But the Establishment Clause "rest[s] on the belief 
that a union of government and religion tends to destroy gov-
ernment and to degrade religion." Engel v. Vitale, 370 
U. S., at 431 (1962). Therefore, "[t]he Constitution decrees 
that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the 
family, and the institutions of private choice, and that while 
some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines 
must be drawn." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 625. Be-
cause "the controlling constitutional standards have become 
firmly rooted and the broad contours of our inquiry are now 
well defined," Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
413 U. S., at 761, the position of those lines has by now be-
come quite clear and requires affirmance of the Court of 
Appeals. 
It is so ordered. 
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STANFORD LAW SCHOOL 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington, DC 20543 
Dear Lewis: 
July 5, 1985 
Many thanks for your notes of July 1. 
The Stevas-Wong-Powell axis worked perfectly: the Friday opinions got 
into my hands by late afternoon on that day, in ample time for our Saturday 
morning session. Although most of the cases were not major ones for our 
purposes, I sat up until the very late hours after the Friday night banquet 
reading every word (and passing along a couple of them to my fellow 
panelists before the Saturday morning session). That caused me to lose some 
sleep, and I regretted that by about midnight Saturday our time, when we 
were landing at San Francisco airport after a long drive from The Homestead 
to Washington on Saturday afternoon and an even longer flight back that 
evening.(Barbara had to be back here quickly in order to begin an intensive 
summer course she is teaching now in lithography.) But we have recuperated 
from that and I was very glad to have the opinions. Thanks again for your 
help. 
I am glad the establishment cases did not come down until Monday: if 
they had come down Friday, as I feared they might, Dick Howard would have 
had to rush back to Washington and would not have been able to J01n us 
Saturday morning. I suppose Dick, who argued the Michigan case, is 
especially pleased; but as a mere academic observer, I couldn't be more 
delighted myself with the outcome. I have had some private arguments about 
Geoff Stone's (of Chicago) comments in a lecture, really quite hysterical for 
him, at the end of the last term, in Georgia, identifying the 1983 term as 
one of those every generation turning point terms of the Court, and pointing 
especially at the Rhode Island creche case to argue that, among other basic 
rights, the establishment clause had bitten the dust. As you know, I have long 
argued against jumping to cosmic conclusions on the basis of limited data, 
but I must confess, after reading the Lynch opinion, I felt a bit shaky 
myself. I am glad that this term's cases, and particularly last Monday'~ 
proved people like Geoff wrong. 
Barbara and I really had a wonderful time at The Homestead. A Virginia 
acquaintance who we ran into as we entered the hotel warned us that we 
should not confuse The Homestead with present day Virginia -- that The 
Gerald Gunther, 
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Homestead represented Virginia of two generations ago, not today. But we 
spent a lot of time with present day Virginians at the Conference, and any 
group that can preserve and enjoy as gracious and delightful a place as 
The Homestead into the late 20th century has my admiration. 
I began the Saturday morning session with my views on Garcia -- views 
with which you are generally familiar, because they are a variant of what I 
said in my formal speech to the D.C. Circuit. I was delighted that Dick 
Howard, who spoke next, fully endorsed my position, although Walter 
Dellinger~ criticized it, albeit not damagingly in my view. 
Having a chance to meet Lewis III was one of the highlights of the 
enjoyable days at The Homestead. I noticed on Thursday, when Barbara and I 
spent a few minutes at the pool, that a Lewis Powell had signed in there, 
together with half a dozen other couples. I walked around the sand trying 
to identify him, rather suspected that it was the handsome young fellow 
studiously reading a legal document (it turned out to be a deposition), but 
was hesitant to disrupt his reading. Fortunately, we were introduced to him 
soon after and we saw a good deal of him for the remainder of the 
Conference. 
We both enjoyed speaking with your very nice son and daughter-in-law. 
Barbara spoke of him as not only one of the nicest and most gentle people 
she had met, but also as just a "beautiful" young man physically. I assume 
the latter remark stems from her artistic inclinations, and her role as a 
teacher of life drawing courses. Even to my lay eye, he is truly a handsome 
and engaging young man. I gathered that he is doing a good deal of business 
right on the Stanford campus these days, in his work for Syntex, and I have 
strongly urged him, if more depositions are in the offing, that he let us 
know and give us a chance to see more of him out here. Indeed, with our 
children out of the house, we have a number of spare beds, including a quite 
adequate guest room, and I have urged him to make use of it whenever he can. 
I look forward to seeing more of him here. 
I will write Al Stevas a note to thank him for his help in getting the 
opinions down to Hot Springs. The package on Wednesday morning was ready 
for me at the back door, as we began our drive there. And, as I said, we 
had the Thursday and Friday opinions by late Friday afternoon. 
We do hope that you will get the maximum possible relaxation and rest 
this summer, and that all will go well and speedily if you do have to return 
to the hospital on the hernia. It was really very good to see you at the 
Court. 
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July 17, 1985 
David 0 . Maxwell 
Chairman of the Board and 
Chief Executive Officer 
Justice Lewis Powell 
550 N Street, SW 
washington, DC 20024 
Dear Justice Powell: 
FannieMae 
I have never known whether it was proper to comment 
on the decisions of the Supreme Court from a 
personal standpoint, but if not, I hope you will 
forgive me for writing to express my gratitude 
for your position in the recent cases involving 
the separation of church and state in this country. 
I have always felt that religion should be a 
private affair, lest we risk the consequences 
of that divisiveness and strife of which you 
wrote so eloquently in your opinion. 
Joan joins me in sending warmest regards to you 
and Mrs. Powell. 
Sincerely, 
DOM/mk 
.. 
; . 
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